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Abstract
Fault-tolerance, which is a complement to fault prevention, is an effective
method of achieving ultra-high reliability. By taking this approach
fault-free computation can be achieved despite the presence of fault in the
system. In this thesis three new fault tolerant techniques are presented and
their advantages over well known fault-tolerant strategies are shown. One
of these new techniques achieves higher reliability than any other similar
techniques presented in the literature.
Generally fault-tolerant structures consist of four major blocks: the
replicated modules, the disagreement and detection circuit, the switching
circuit, and the voting mechanism. The most critical component in a
fault-tolerant system is the voter because the final output of the system is
computed by this component. This dissertation presents a new
implementation for voters which reduces both the complexity and the
occupied area on the chip.
The structures of the three techniques developed in this work are such
that the complexity of their switching mechanisms grows only linearly
with the number of modules but the voting mechanism complexity
increases significantly. This is a better approach than those schemes in
which the switching complexity increases significantly and the voter's
complexity remains constant or grows linearly with the number of
modules because it is easier to implement a complex voter than a complex
switch (voters have more regular structures).
Extensive comparisons are made between different fault-tolerant
techniques. A new reliability model is also developed for system reliability
evaluation of the new designs. The result of these analyses are plotted,
and the advantages of the new techniques are demonstrated. In the final
part of the work an expert system is described which uses the knowledge
acquired by these comparisons. This expert system is meant as a prototype ....
of a component of a CAD tool which will act as an advisor on
fault-tolerant techniques.
1
To the memory of my father,
to my mother,
to my wife, and my children ( Nasrin and Farzin )
CONTENTS
Abstract 	  i
Contents 	
Acknowledgements 	  vii
Chapter 1: Introduction 	  1
1.1 Introduction 	 2
1.2 General Methods of Improving System Reliability	 3
1.3 Fault-Tolerance in Systems 	 6
Chapter 2: Reliability	  10
2.1 Introduction 	 11
2.2 Reliability and Cost 	  12
2.3 Reliability Definition 	  13
2.4 Failure Rate
	
15
2.5 Relation between reliability and failure rate 	  16
2.6 Mean Time Between Failure 	  19
2.7 The Mean Time To Failure 	  21
2.8 Availability 	  21
2.9 Reliability Prediction 	  23
2.10 Summary 	 27
Chapter 3: Methods of Improving Reliability of systems 	  28
3.1 Introduction 	  29
3.2 Fault-Avoidance 	  30
11
3.3 Fault-Tolerance 	 31
3.4 Principles of Fault-Tolerance 	
 32
3.5 How Fault-tolerance can be implemented
	
 34
3.5.1HardwareRedundancy 	 35
3.6 Classification of Redundancy Techniques
	
 35
3.6.1 Static Redundancy (masking redundancy)
	
 36
3.6.2 Cost to be paid for Triple Modular Redundancy (IMR)... 37
3.6.3 Advantages of Triple Modular Redundancy (TMR)
	
 38
3.6.4 Dynamic Redundancy Technique (standby sparing)
	  39
3.6.5 Some examples of dynamic redundancy techniques
	
 42
3.6.6 Hybrid Redundancy Technique 	 42
3.7 Choosing between TMR and standby Sparing
	
 44
3.8 Responsive Redundancy Techniques
	
 44
3.9 Self-Purging Redundancy Scheme
	 45
3.10 Sift-Out Modular Redundancy (SMR)
	 48
3.11 Comparison with other Systems
	
 51
3.11.1 Comparing SMR with TMR
	
 51
3.11.2 Comparing with N-tuple Modular Redundancy
	
 52
3.11.3 Comparing with Hybrid Scheme
	
 53
3.11.4 Comparing with Self-Purging technique
	
 53
3.12 Summary 	
 53
Chapter 4: New Fault-Tolerant Designs
	
 56
4.1 Introduction 	 57
4.2 Five Modular Redundancy Reconfigurable Scheme 	 58
111
4.3 Comparison with other similar schemes 	 64
4.4 Design Improvement	
 65
4.5 Multiple Fault-Tolerant Reconfigurable Structure 	  71
4.5.1 Realisation of the Highly Reliable Highly Efficient Structure 71
4.6 A Highly Reliable Highly Efficient Hardware
Redundancy Structure	 76
4.7 Realisation of the Highly Reliable Highly Efficient
Structure ( HR-HE ) 	 77
4.8 Highly Reliable Highly Efficient Structure Compared with
other Fault-tolerant Designs 	  82
4.9 Summary	 87
Chapter 5: Reliability Comparisons of Different Techniques
	 88
5.1 Introduction 	 89
5.2 Reliability Modeling and the Assumptions
	  90
5.3 Reliability of a Non-Redundant System
	  92
5.4 Reliability of a Triple Modular Redundancy (TMR) System
	  92
5.5 Reliabilty of an N-tuple Modular Redundancy Structure 	  104
5.6 Reliability of a Dynamic Redundancy Structure 	  107
5.7 Hybrid Design's Reliability 	  110
5.8 Levels of Reliability Models 	  116
5.9 A New Reliability Model 	 118
5.10 Comparing Schemes 	  124
5.10.1 Mission Time Improvement of Higly Reliable
Highly Efficent Scheme over 'TMR 	 125
iv
5.10.2 Comparing Higly Reliable-Highly Efficent Scheme
with Multiple Fault Tolerant Reconfiguable Structure
and TMR
	
 128
5.11 Critical Components in Fault-tolerant Structures
	
 134
5.12 Implementation of the Voters in Fault-Tolerant Designs
	
 135
5.13 Modular Approach for the Voter Implementation
	
 136
5.14 Summary 	 143
Chapter 6: Application of Expert System in Fault-Tolerant Designs
	 145
6.1 Expert Systems 	 146
6.1.1 Introductoin
	
 146
6.1.2 Why build an expert system?
	 147
6.2 Development of an Expert System
	
 149
6.3 How an Expert System Operates
	 150
6.3.1 The Knowledge Base	 150
6.3.2 The Inference Engine 	 151
6.3.3 The Forward-Chaining Method
	
 152
6.3.4 The Backward-Chaining Method
	
 153
6.3.5 The Rule-Value Method 	 155
6.4 Choosing a Method 	 156
6.5 Creating the Expert System
	 157
6.6 The Structure of the Expert System
	 157
6.6.1 The main body
	
 158
6.6.2 Entering the Knowledge into the Knowledge Base
	 159
6.6.3 Using the Inference Engine
	
 161
V
6.7 Summary	
 163
Chapter 7: Conclusions and Future Research	
 164
7.1 Conclusions 	
 165
7.2 Fault-prevention and testing difficulties 	
 166
7.2.1 Test Pattern Generation 	 166
7.2.2 Cost of Testing 	 167
7.2.3 Testing VLSI chips (exhaustive testing ) 	 167
7.3 Reliability and Fault-Tolerant computing 	
 168
7.4 Application of Fault-Tolerant techniques in Testing 	
 173
7.5 Reliability modelling 	 174
7.6 Future Research 	
 175
References 	 177
Appendix A. 	
 188
Appendix B 	
 190
vi
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS
I would like to thank my supervisor, Professor Gerald Musgrave for his
help, encouragement and advice throughout the course of this project.
My thanks also goes to my co-supervisor Dr. Robert Zimmer , for many
useful discussions and invaluable advice in the final year of this
project. I would like to express my gratitude to Mr. Derek Milligan, for
giving me much of his valuable time, and for his constructive
suggestions during the final year of this research. I would also like to
thank my colleagues at Brunel University for their support and
stimulating discussions.
Finally, my wife deserves very special thanks for her continued
support, help, and encouragement throughout this research.
vii
CHAPTER ONE
INTRODUCTION
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1.1 - Introduction
During the 1970s and 1980s , integrated circuits (ICs) reached incredible
levels of sophistication, with manufacturers fabricating circuits
containing many tens of thousands of logic gates on a single chip.
Fig 1.1 illustrates the remarkably rapid growth of circuit complexity
during the last two decades.
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Fig. 1.1 Integrated circuit complexity versus time
This complexity has been automatically incorporated into the devices
and systems implemented by these sophisticated ICs. While the
number of components that can be supported on a chip is increasing,
the chip itself is becoming susceptible to an increasing variety of
failures, ranging from internal opens and shorts to encapsulation and
bonding failures. Given the complexity of the ICs and digital systems,
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and accepting that their complex design and construction are
susceptible to the inherent fallibility of those who design and construct,
and also taking into account the limitations imposed by the technology
used, it would be surprising indeed if any modern computing system
provides its intended service with ultra-high reliability. It is not
sufficient just to design and manufacture complex ICs and digital
systems, but system designers and manufacturers must also present
measures to improve the reliability of these complex devices and
systems.
In fact the drastically increased reliability requirements of digital
systems forces the designers to attempt methods to achieve high
reliability. As an example the reliability for the Saturn V launch
computer (1964) was only 0.99 for 250 hours, in comparison to the late
1970s FTMP and SIFT computers with reliability requirements of 10 -9
failures per hours over the 10 hour mission time.
1.2 - General Methods of Improving System Reliability
Generally there are two approaches to increasing the reliability of
systems.
I - The first is the traditional approach which is called fault prevention.
By taking this approach designers and manufacturers try to prevent
system failure by ensuring that all possible causes of unreliability have
been removed from the system before the system is put into service.
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Fault prevention has two aspects, namely, fault avoidance, and fault
removal. Fault avoidance is concerned with design methodologies and
the selection techniques which aim to avoid the introduction of faults
during the design and manufacturing of a system. The use of reliable
components is an example of fault avoidance. Fault removal is
concerned with checking the implementation of a system and
removing those faults which are exposed.
Design For Testability (DFT) which concerns the improvement of the
controllability and the observability of VLSI circuits to ease testing of
these devices has been very successful , but even under this technique
testing of VLSI devices is a serious problem for the designers and
manufacturers of these devices. In many ways, testing a very large scale
integrated circuit is more difficult than designing it. It is both possible
and likely that a large integrated circuit will contain embedded
elements that cannot practically be tested even when methods such as
exhaustive testing ( i.e. testing every conceivable operating state ) is
employed.
For complex circuits, exhaustive testing becomes unrealistic. For
instance, an exhaustive test of the 8080 microcomputer, only modestly
complicated by today's standards, would take over 10 to 20 years, at one
million tests a second [ Fe 83 ], or a microprocessor such as Motorola
68000 would take many years of CPU time to test exhaustively. Thus
one may conclude that the primary stumbling blocks in VLSI circuit
development are therefore testing of the devices, not design and
fabrication. The problem of testing VLSI devices is aggravated by the
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shortage of test engineers and the high costs of testing, in addition to
the difficulties of developing programmes that control the Automated
Test Equipment (ATE) .
However, despite the adoption of fault prevention techniques, faults
will occur during the operation of systems . So when operation
without failure is required despite the presence of faults, the adoption
of the above strategies alone in general is insufficient. There is also an
upper limit for improvement of component or system reliability due
to design methodology, cost limitations , and available manufacturing
techniques. Indeed this is the most important reason behind the
implementation of designs taking another approach called
fault-tolerance .
II - The second approach for increasing the reliability of systems is
fault-tolerance . By definition a fault tolerant computing system is a
system which can compute correctly even with the presence of faults in
its hardware or its software. The important objective of fault-tolerant
design is to enhance the reliability of digital systems which can not be
achieved by adopting the fault-prevention approach. Apart from
ultra-high reliability needs, fault-tolerant computing is driven by other
key factors, such as ultrahigh availability (e.g. the ESS system of Bell
Telephone, which has an availability requirement of only 2 minutes
down-time per year [To78] ), reduced life-cycle costs (which is a major
manufacturing objective in commercial computers), and long-life
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applications (for instance, the very high survival problem warranted
in spacecraft computers such as the one planned for the Galileo
spacecraft).
Other major factors influencing growth and development of
fault-tolerant computers include the tradeoffs between the lack of high
reliability and the loss of computational power. Also the use of
computers at the critical points makes it essential that they not only be
highly available , but especially , reliable , so as to encourage their
acceptance and use by the general public. A good example here is the
ultimate goal of paperless offices and banks which is impossible to
achieve without the availability of low-cost, highly available, and
highly reliable computers.
The design of highly reliable computers is actually much more
complex than the design of other complex human made objects (e.g.
robots, airplanes, etc. ). Perhaps this can be better grasped by looking at
one statement in the IEEE Spectrum ( Oct 81 p.41 ): "Information
processing errors can occur through a failure lasting a billionth of a
second in one of the hundreds of thousands of digital components that
switch billions of times a day,".
1.3 - Fault-tolerance in systems
Fault-tolerance is incorporated in a system by adding redundancy (i.e. a
system or a component will be replicated many times). The redundancy
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can be in the form of software, hardware, or a combination of both.
To obtain the correct output of a system designed to tolerate failures,
the following blocks are generally used.
I) A voting mechanism to vote on the outputs of the replicated
modules or components.
II) A disagreement detection circuit to detect any failures occurring
during the operation of the system.
III) A switching mechanism to take measures for reconfiguration of
the system when failures occur.
This research discusses the above compartments in detail and develops
three new fault-tolerant designs to improve the overall system
reliability
The first design concentrates on the number of gates used in the
switching mechanism. As a result a switching circuit is developed
which use fewer gates than other similar designs proposed by others.
In the second design, the disagreement detection circuit will be
optimised as well as the switching mechanism. The switch structure in
this design is such that it does not propagate the failures from one
component to the other switch components. This feature has a
beneficial effect for reliability improvement.
The structure of the switch in the third design is such that it has the
same features as in the second design, in addition, it can tolerate more
failures than other techniques including the above schemes, thus a
better reliability improvement can be achieved by this technique.
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As the voting component in any fault-tolerant design is the most
critical component, an approach will be presented in this work to
implement this component as simply as possible. To be able to
implement a highly reliable voter, a modular structure is used to
minimise the chip area as well as using as few transistors as possible.
A new reliability model has been developed and used in an extensive
comparison of fault-tolerant techniques (including the new designs) .
The reliability improvement made by the designs is also shown.
The last part of this research involves the initial development of an
expert system which can be used as part of a CAD tool. The expert
system will use the knowledge resulting from the comparitive study to
advise on the fault-tolerant technique that best suits a particular
application.
A short detailed break-down of the dissertation is given below:
Chapter Two reviews the basics of reliability theory definitions and a
few useful definitions used throughout this work.
Chapter three focuses on the general methods that can be used to
achieve highly reliable computing system which is the objective of this
research. After a short discussion about fault-prevention approach, the
complementary approach, that is fault tolerance will be discussed and a
description of a few fault-tolerant designs will be presented for the
purpose of reliability comparison.
Chapter four discusses a powerful fault-tolerant technique published
recently and shows that the published technique is not efficient with a
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large number of modules. An improvement to this technique will be
proposed which will operate correctly and requires fewer gates. Then
two new fault-tolerant techniques will be presented. It will be shown
that reliability improvement and higher fault-tolerance can be
achieved by the adoption of these designs.
Chapter five discusses the classical reliability model and compare the
reliability of triple modular redundancy systems ( TMR ), N-tuple
Modular Redundancy ( NMR) system, and hybrid redundancy
techniques with the reliability of a non-redundant system. Then a new
reliability model will be presented and the reliability of systems using
the new fault tolerant techniques mentioned in chapter four will be
evaluated by the new model. Finally a new approach will be discussed
for the implementation of the voters used in all fault-tolerant designs.
This design approach for the voters dramatically reduces the number
of transistors for their implementation, particularly when the number
of basic modules in the fault-tolerant designs exceeds three.
Consequently the overall reliability of the system will be improved.
Chapter 6 deals with an expert system (that could be part of a CAD
system) on fault-tolerant techniques and their reliabilities and will
operate as an adviser.
Chapter seven presents the conclusion and future research that can be
done in this area.
9
CHAPTER TWO 
RELIABILITY
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2.1 - Introduction
Digital systems undertake a great variety of important tasks such as
controlling nuclear power stations, monitoring patients in hospitals
space programmes, agriculture and production lines in large and small
plants. Considering these important applications , the reliability of
digital systems should receive more attention. Thus more effort must
be made to study, design, and evaluate reliable systems. Generally a
reliability engineer is concerned with a wide rang of topics, which
make his task more difficult. Apart from the environmental
conditions and specifications, the reliability engineer should be
involved in mathematical aspects such as probability and statistics,
some physics in the study of failure, and electronics for components
and product characteristics. Therefore a reliability engineer faces a wide
variety of physical and mathematical problems in addition to those
arising from his own area of reliability engineering.
To design and evaluate reliable systems, it is helpful to review some
previous work in this area and investigate the techniques which have
been used for reliability improvement. But first, study of reliability
principles and some basic definitions as the mathematical background
for reliability analysis and modelling is necessary. Understanding these
principles and methods is an essential ingredient of the analysis.
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2.2 - Reliability and Cost
Cost is an important parameter in the design and manufacture of a
digital system. Users of any system are usually aware of the extra cost
involved with imperfect and unreliable systems. Manufacturers of
domestic products such as T.V.s, washing machines, and similar
products, suffer high costs due to failures under warranty. The cost of
system down-time and unreliability in communications, telephone
switching, airlines, military and public services is often very high. This
is however on top of the extra costs due to the system failure.
In order to have an idea of the total cost, it is useful to divide it into
different groups .
First:	 the initial purchasing cost including design, development and
manufacturing.
Second: a- the maintenance and repair cost during system operation.
b- the cost of standby equipment for reliability improvement.
Attempts to increase reliability, rapidly increase the design and
development costs, and therefore the initial purchase costs. On the
other hand the maintenance is less for more reliable systems.
The total cost of a system ( known as cost of ownership ) [PaOco 81 1
and its relation with initial purchase, and other costs is shown in
Fig.2.1. However there is a point that reliability can not be further
improved (either economically or practically) , as shown in the graph.
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2.3 - Reliability Definition
There is no dispute about the need for reliable systems, but some vague
notion of reliability is not sufficient in engineering. Exact definition
and additional quantitative value is needed. Reliability of a digital
system can be defined as follows:
The reliability of system (measured at a time T) is the
probability that the system has not failed up to time T, subject
to specified environmental conditions, e.g. specified
temperature, vibration, humidity and so on [Fe 57].
Thus a value can be assigned to the reliability of a system. For example
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a piece of equipment can have a reliability of 95 per cent over a 400
hour period, subject to a maximum vibration of V and the
temperature in the range of 15 oc to 30 oc, and a mild humidity. The
above definition of reliability is genek ally accepted, but this definition is
not a complete definition for the whole life of a system from the
starting time to the end. In practice, however more details about a
system are needed. Thus more factors should be considered. For
instance, the age of a digital system is a factor that should be taken into
account. For a correct operation in a specified period under a specified
condition, the system must be operating correctly at the beginning of
the observation period . But the definition does not distinguish
between a new system, which is starting its life, an established system
which has been operational for a considerable time with its faults
already corrected and a system which is been used for a long time and
due wear out. For a new equipment, generally there is an initial period
of high failure rate , which takes some times before the faults are
detected , located , and repaired. During this period the failure rate falls
rapidly to a value which is almost constant over a long period. After
the initial period the useful life of the system starts. The reverse
situation applies with regards to system wearing out, since the failure
rate increases sharply as the system gets older. Fig. 2.2 shows the failure
rate in these periods. The shape is often referred to as a bathtub curve
[MuIa0k87]. The above reliability definition may be quoted for the
useful life period.
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The graph shows the failure rate as a function of time. There are some
basic definitions in reliability that should be reviewed before any
discussion about the reliability estimation of a system.
2.4 - Failure Rate
The failure rate is defined as the number of failures per unit time,
compared with the number of surviving components. Often this is
assumed to be constant during the useful life of the system and is
represented by X .
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2.5 - Relation between reliability and failure rate
Suppose that a system consists of N identical components. Let S(t) be
the number of surviving components at time t ( i.e. the number of
components still operating at time t), and Q(t) is the number of
components that failed up to time t. Then the probability of survival of
the components also known as the reliability R(t), is given by
2.1	 R (t) = S (t)N
The probability of failure of the components up to time t is given by
2.2 F (t) = Q(0N
Since S (t) + Q (t) = N we must have
2.3 R (t) + F (t) =1	 or	 F (t) = 1 - R (t)
An important function derived from F (t) is its derivative with
respect to time, which often will be used in reliability analysis.
Since F (t) is a probability, its derivative is a probability distribution
function, and is defined as
2.4	 f(t) = d F(t)dt
f (t) shows the probability of failures per unit time. Using equation 2.3
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2.5	 f(t) —  d [1 - R(0]_ - dR(t)dt	 dt
Hence the probability of a failure during the period from 0 to time t is
t
2.6	 F(t) = f f(t) dt
0
Now the failure rate ( A. ), as defined earlier, can be derived as follows:
The number of failure per unit time Failure rate — The number of surviving components
x . 1	 d Q(t)	 .	 1 
(t) .
N. d
dt
F(t) 
S (t) . dt ' 
using equations 2.1 and 2.2	 X — 
N. R
1 d F(t)2.7	 a. = R(t) . dt
Using equation 2.3 the failure rate can be written as:
-1 d R(t)2.8	 a. = R(t) . dt
This expression may be integrated from 0 to time t, giving
t
X. dt = -
1R(t)
d R(t)
The limits of integration are obtained as follows:
at time t = 0, R(t) = 1 and at time t by definition the reliability is R(e.
or
10 1
R(t)
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Assuming X is constant, we obtain
Xt = - log R(t)	 -At = log R(t)
2.9	 R(t) = exp ( -Xt )
A
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Fig 2.3 Reliability as a function of time
Therefore system reliability can be computed using the above
equation, assuming that the failure rate X is constant. Note that
equation 2.9 can be considered as a general expression for reliability
evaluation. The reliability figure obtained by the above equation is not
the ideal for practical use, because the system reliability will be
different for different time periods. For this reason another reliability
measure is used which is not depended on different operating time.
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2.6 - Mean Time Between Failure (MTBF)
A useful comparison of the reliability of different systems is the, Mean
Time Between Failure (MTBF), which is the average time that a
system will run between failures. If f(t) is the probability of failure per
unit time, then MTBF can be expressed by equation 2.10.
2.10	 MTBF . f t f(t) dt
0
Using equation 2.5
MTBF .-f t . dR (t)  . dt and integrating by parts we obtaindt
MTBF . - [ t . R(t) ] °o + 1 R(t) dt
0
At t . 0, R(t) = 1, so t . R(t) . 0. As t increases R(t) decreases and as t
tends to co, t . R(t) tends to zero. Thus the first term in the above
equation is zero, and the general expression for MTBF, with X as a
function of time, will be given by
MTBF = f R(t) dt
0
The above equation can be used for any failure distribution. Under the
00
00
0
00
00
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assumption of constant failure rate, MTBF is given by
.
2.11	 MTBF = f exp ( - Xt ) dt
0
1	 .2.12	 MTBF = - —X [ exp ( - Xt ) dt]
1
= —0 X
Therefore the MTBF of a system is the reciprocal of the failure rate. If X
is the number of failures per hour, then the MTBF is expressed in
hours. The MTBF as defined above, is a concept applicable to any type
of equipment which can be repaired by the replacement of a faulty
component or unit. However, if all other parameters are the same,
then the equipment with the greatest MTBF will be the most reliable,
regardless of the period of observation. Thus MTBF provides the most
convenient way of reliability comparison. The difficulty with this
approach is the time needed to repair a fault. If this is the same in all
cases then the equipment with the greatest MTBF will be preferred.
However, there may be circumstances in which a short repair time is
more important than a long MTBF, so other measures of reliability are
needed.
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2.7 - The Mean Time To Failure (MTTF )
The MTBF is a measure of reliability for repairable equipment. A
similar measure is useful for components that can not be repaired or
are more cheaply replaced. The correct measure for these components
is the Mean Time To Failure (MTTF). This may be calculated from the
results of life testing as follows. Let a set of N items be tested until all
have failed, the time to failure being t 1, t2, ..., tn . Then the observed
MTTF is given by
vn2.13	 M = -1 LI,,
n .	 11.1
The failure rate will as before be given by
2.14
	
X 1
if X, is independent of time.
2.8 - Availability
Sometimes the users of digital systems are concerned with other factors
as well as the reliability of the systems. The reliability tells them the
probability of system operation in a certain period with a certain
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condition without a failure. Although it is valuable, the users need
further information which takes into account the time lost due to
repairing faults. In other words the user need to know what is the
available period of the system for useful work. If we represent U as the
up-time or the available period of the system and D as the down-time,
availability can be defined as
2.15	 A= U+D
IT2.16	 A= U + ( number of failure* MTTR )
where MTTR is Mean Time To Repair, and defined as the average time
needed for a failed system to be repaired and restored to working order.
U	 	 1A —	=
U+ (U*X*MTTR) 1 + ( X*MTTR)
MTBF1 
since X= MTBF + MTTR	 — MTBF
Now if we reduce MTTR, availability will be increased and the system
will be more economical. A system where faults are rapidly diagnosed
is more desirable than a system which has a lower failure rate but
difficult to detect and locate the fault, and consequently longer
down-time is needed for repair.
II
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2.9 - Reliability Prediction
To predict the reliability of a complex system we partition the system
into subsystems or the components used to construct it. Then the
assessment of system reliability can be constructed from the probability
theory for these systems. The subsystems or components are connected
either in series or in parallel or both. Therefore to illustrate the
functional relation between the various components of the system and
the way in which a failure of each component would affect the overall
system performance, we use a reliability model.
We consider three models.
1) Series system
In this model the components are connected in series. To have an
operational system, all of the components should be operational and to
have a correct output, all of them must work correctly i.e. a failure in
any of the subsystems causes system failure. Fig. 2.4 shows the structure
of this model.
Input	 	 	 M	 Output
( a )
Input —I M
	4
I m I- ... --I m Output
( b )
Fig 2.4 ( a ) - a basic module
( b ) - replication of the basic module in series
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In this arrangement if the reliability of each subsystem is Ri , the
overall system reliability is
n
2.17	 R=R1*R2*...*Rn
	
R=ll Ri
2) Parallel systems
In the previous model we had no redundancy. In other words, to
achieve the correct operation, the presence and correct performance of
each component for construction of the system was necessary and
essential. For a minimum design and production cost to carry out a
specific task, series system is the normal choice of the designer. In
parallel system we use extra or redundant components which are not
necessary for performance of a specific task, but to increase the
reliability of the system. The general principle requires the provision of
more than one way of meeting the functional requirements of the
system. Therefore if one of the components fail, it can not affect the
system's output, while other subsystems or components are operating
satisfactorily. Such a system is called a redundant system. In this model
the designer will be able to improve the reliability, but there is a price
to pay for this reliability improvement, that is the design cost and the
manufacturing cost will be increased. Fig 2.5 shows a system using this
model. In any digital system using this structure, there is a switching
mechanism at point B shown in figure 2.5 to select and switch out the
output of the system. There are different arrangements of this structure
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( a )
MInput Output
Output
which will be discussed in the later chapters.
( b )
Fig 2.5 ( a ) - a basic module
( b ) - replication of the basic module in parallel
If only one of the modules is active and others used as spares, then the
overall system reliability of such a system will be obtained by equation
2.18 (provided that there is a mechanism to check the operation of he
active module and reports if it fails).
2.18	 Rsys= 1 - ( 1 -Rm)N
where Rm is the reliability of the original system, Rsys is the overall
reliability of the system. In the above equation, the switching
mechanism is assumed to be fault free, and the reliability of all
modules assumed to be equal.
Input
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An example of using this structure is the Bell Electronic Switching
System (ESS) [To 78].
In practice a system normally consists of a combination of series and
parallel subsystems. Fig 2.6 shows mixed interconnections of a few
subsystems.
Ell El
0 El
Fig 2.6 Mixed arrangement of series and parallel
The mixed arrangement is frequently used where some part of the
system is particularly prone to failure and is consequently duplicated or
triplicated. Examples are Pluribus system [KaEt 78], Sperry Univac
1100/60 computer [BoLiSe 80], and Computer Voter Multiprocessor
(C.vmp) [SiEt 78].
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2.10 - Summary
In this chapter the mathematical background necessary for reliability
analyses, was developed.
The relationship between cost and reliability was shown by a curve
known as cost of ownership. The curve reflects that more reliable
systems have lower maintenance costs but are more expensive to buy.
This curve can be used as a guide for customers.
The basic definitions for reliability evaluations were reviewed. It was
shown that the exponential distribution is the most suitable
distribution to be used for reliability analysis of digital systems because
the failure rate is approximately constant during the useful life time of
systems (Fig 2.2).
We also showed how to compute the reliability of a system from the
reliability of its subsystems (modelled in series, parallel, or
combination of both) .
27
CHAPTER THREE
METHODS OF IMPROVING SYSTEM RELIABILITY
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3.1 - Introduction
As we mentioned in the previous chapters, the rapidly increasing
application of computers to areas where the loss of real-time
computing power could be catastrophic has brought with it the need for
very high reliability. For example process control systems in big plants,
control systems in nuclear power stations, or systems which undertake
patients' monitoring in care units and the like, should be operational
at all times, and must operate continuously without interruption .
This means that a failure must be diagnosed , and appropriate
measures should be taken to repair or reconfigure the system within a
fraction of a second. Therefore techniques should be designed
developed , and applied to minimise or even eliminate service
interruptions of the system. In another words appropriate techniques
should be used to increase the reliability of the system.
There are generally two approaches to the improvement of reliability
of computing systems. The first approach is called fault-prevention
(fault intolerance) , and the second one is fault-tolerance. In the next
section we briefly describe the fault avoidance approach . Then in the
following sections the fault-tolerance approach will be reviewed.
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3.2 - Fault - prevention
The objective of the fault-prevention approach is to construct systems
so as to reduce the possibility of a failure by, for example using high
reliability components, or adding circuitry that make it easier to test
the system (design for testability). In addition, a design rule that limits
the fan-out of gates, will decrease power dissipation and therefore
reduce thermal effects, thus reducing the probability of hard failures.
Fan-out limitation also increases the effective noise margin at the
inputs of subsequent gates and thus decreases the possibility of a
transient fault. Human errors can be minimised by measures such as
labelling, documentation, and producing components and boards that
can only be used or assembled in the correct way.
In practice however it is impossible to design and develop a system in
which there is a guarantee that no failure will occur. During its
manufacturing and operation time, a component or element may fail
which may cause the entire system to fail (hence the name fault
intolerance).
There are many cases in which fault prevention alone cannot meet
system design specifications. In these cases fault-tolerance techniques
should be used. In the fault tolerance approach, faults are expected to
occur during the operation of the system, but by using redundancy, the
faults will be masked or the faulty units will be replaced by good units
automatically (reconfiguration) without any interruption in the system
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operation: the system can continue to function correctly in spite of
fault presence.
3.3 - Fault - Tolerance
Fault-tolerance is defined as the ability to produce correct results even
in the presence of faults, [Av67] [GoLeSh66] [GrMiRo62]. Fault-tolerance
is not a replacement of fault-prevention approach but a complement to
it. Research activities in the area of fault-tolerant design has increased
recently due to the following factors which have had a major impact
on the design of these systems.
I- Advances in Very Large Scale Integration (VLSI) technology have
resulted in complex chips. This complexity could make the IC's
susceptible to a diverse variety of failures and could lead to a decrease
in reliability.
II- Lower cost of extremely complex components and devices have
made it economical to introduce redundancy into the system.
III- Testing of complex components and systems are time-consuming
and expensive, moreover there is a shortage of test equipment and
experts.
IV- There is an ever-increasing demand for high reliability systems to
undertake safety-critical applications, despite the fact that there is an
upper limit to the reliability levels that can be achieved, using the
fault-prevention approach.
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V- In many applications, the system down-time needs to be minimised
or even eliminated to improve the availability of the system.
Basic to the design and implementation of fault-tolerant computing
systems are consideration of the following three factors.
Firstly, it is necessary to identify the basic principles which underlie all
fault tolerant systems. Principles that can be applied at all levels in a
system.
Secondly, the measures and mechanisms to support and implement
techniques based on these principles must be investigated.
Thirdly, a framework is required to support a well structured approach
to fault-tolerance in order to ensure that the additional complexity
introduced by the fault tolerance techniques does not reduce rather
than increase the reliability of the system.
3.4 - Principles of Fault - Tolerance
To prevent faults leading to system failures five phases should be
identified.
I) Error detection
The presence of a fault in a system can produce an error which can
cause a failure in the system. In order to tolerate a fault in a system
generally its effects must first be detected, therefore an error
detection mechanism should be deployed.
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II) Reconfiguration
If a fault is detected and a permanent failure located, the system
should be able to reconfigure its components to replace the failed
component or to isolate it from the rest of the system.
III) Retry
In many cases a second attempt at an operation may be successful.
This is particularly true in case of a transient fault. Thus a retry
mechanism should be available in the system to handle these
cases.
IV) Reset
An error may cause too much damage to the system such that
retry can not be successful and recovery may not be possible. In
this case the system needs to be reset or restarted and therefore the
design should provide these facilities.
IV) Fault treatment and continued service
After detection and (if necessary) reconfiguration, the effects of
errors must be eliminated, and retry or reset should be used to
check if the component can be used again ( e.g. if failure caused by
transient error). If possible the failed component should be
replaced, repaired, and then put back to service.
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It is possible to have a fault-tolerant design with different permutations
of this procedure. However to have an effective independent system all
five phases are required.
Having identified the principles of fault-tolerant design, now their
implementation in hardware systems must be considered. The
question of how fault-tolerance can be implemented in a system will
be addressed in the next sections. But the questions of where
fault-tolerance is actually required and how much is necessary, which
concerns the reliability requirement, will be discussed in chapter five.
3.5 - How fault-tolerance can be implemented
Fault-tolerance can be achieved by incorporating redundancy into the
system, [Kn63] [Kn64]. This redundancy can be in the form of extra
hardware [SuDuCa80] [Ha89] , extra software[ChAv78], or a combination
of both [AvEt71].
Software redundancy can be divided into two parts :
I- Redundancy in space, such as Error Correcting Code (ECC).
II-Redundancy in time such as repetition of some part of the software.
Hardware redundancy on the other hand is the repetition of a
component or a module plus a mechanism to either mask a fault
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[Ne561 or detect the faulty module and switch it out and replace it with
another good module if one is available [MaAv70]. In this thesis we are
dealing with hardware redundancy techniques.
3.5.1 - Hardware Redundancy
One method of increasing reliability is to introduce redundancy into
the circuits to design fault-tolerant systems,[CaJeBo70] [F1581 [Ha89]. One
important point to be noted by a designer is that fault-tolerance is not a
replacement to the principles of reliable system designs, but rather a
supplement to them . The most important of these principles that
should be remembered are as follows:
(a) Use the most reliable components
(b) Keep the system as simple as possible
3.6 - Classification of Redundancy Techniques
There are four major hardware redundancy techniques [Sh68] which
will be explained, the system reliability will be calculated for each of
these techniques, and finally the advantages and disadvantages of each
technique will be discussed. These techniques are:
I- Static or masking redundancy
REDUNDANCY (hardware) 	 II- Dynamic or standby sparing
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III-Hybrid
IV-Responsive Redundancy techniques
3.6.1 - Statistic Redundancy ( masking redundancy )
In this technique the effect of errors is masked by the use of a voter in
hardware. The most common masking redundancy is called. Triple
Modular Redundancy (TMR) [Ne56]. In this technique any module or
component will be repeated three times and there will be a voting
scheme on the outputs of the three modules: the system output is the
majority output of the modules. As long as no more than one of the
modules fails, the output of the voter will be the same as the outputs of
the other two fault free modules, but after the occurrence of the first
failure the system is in a degraded state. The voter could be a majority
voting circuit or a threshold circuit. It is quite useful to partition an
arbitrary TMR network into independent cells, so that a failure in one
cell can not combine with a failure in another cell to cause system
failure. Fig. 3.1 shows the TMR structure.
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Fig 3.1 Triple Modular Redundancy (TMR) structure
3.6.2 - Cost to be paid for TMR (disadvantages)
1_ Area over head, which could be many times of the area used by the
original system , particularly if the replicated component has many
outputs, and if voting mechanism is deployed more than once.
2_ Power over head, at least 3 times, because all modules should be
powered plus the voter. Again this could be much higher than 3 times.
3_ Increase in cost, ( but using cheaper chips partially reduces the
overall cost of a TMR system and make it more practical and
economical).
4_ The voter is critical component: failure in the voting circuit causes
system failure. (This may be partially overcome by triplicating the voter
until the final stage of the system.)
5_ Failure in any module is not revealed to the operator unless extra
circuitry is added to do so. Without this extra circuitry, after the first
error in one of the modules, the system is less reliable than the non-
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redundant system. It is possible to add extra simple circuitry to reveal
the module failure and switch to simplex TMR and or repair the faulty
module if it is repairable. In the long term, the system reliability is less
than that of a non-redundant system.
3.6.3 - Advantages of TMR
1_ It increase the system reliability in short term missions
2_ It can tolerate one failure without delay
3_ It can tolerate all the transient errors without delay as long as they
do not overlap.
4_ It does not need a complex design for the voter or for the TMR
system itself. Therefore, it is recommended for short term mission and
highly reliable systems.
General form of TMR in which the system contains N identical
modules instead of three, is called N Modular Redundancy (NMR).
Generally N is an odd number. Increasing N does not mean increasing
reliability. In fact for N>7 the voter complexity goes up and causes the
voter to be less reliable. But the value of N depends on the system that
Multiple Modular Redundancy is applied to, i.e. for some system N=7
is also too high.
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3.6.4 - Dynamic Redundancy Technique ( standby sparing )
In contrast to the static technique, dynamic redundancy provides error
detection capability [Sh68] [F1581 within system. This technique uses
only one active module and several spare modules. Switching circuits
are needed for detecting and switching out the faulty active module,
and switching-in, a good spare module (reconfiguration) [CaSc68]. So in
this technique terminal activity plays an essential role ( involving fault
detection, diagnosis and the resultant reconfiguration). Fig 3.2
illustrates the concept of dynamic redundancy.
—. Fault detection
• mechanism•
Fig. 3.2 A dynamic Structure with one active module and several
spares
In general, a dynamic redundant system can be divided into two
categories :
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I - Cold-standby system
II- Hot standby system
In a cold standby system one module is powered up and operational,
the other modules are not powered. Replacement of a faulty module by
a spare is effected by turning its power off and powering a spare. In a
hot standby system all the modules are powered up and operating
simultaneously. If the outputs of all modules are the same, the output
of any arbitrarily selected module can be taken as the system output.
When a fault is detected in a module the system is reconfigured, so that
the system output comes from one of the remaining fault free
modules. The detection of a fault in an individual modules of a
dynamic system can be achieved by using one of the following
techniques:
1 _ Periodic tests
2 _ Self checking circuits
3 _ Watch_dog timers
In periodic tests the normal operation of the functional module is
temporally suspended and a test routine is run to determine if faults
are present in the module. A disadvantage of this technique is that it
can not detect temporary faults unless they occur while the module is
tested.
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Self checking circuits provide a very cost effective method of fault
detection. They are designed so that for normal circuit inputs they
provide correct output or indicate the presence of a fault in a module.
Self checking designs are very popular and there are many different
systems which employ self checking circuits [Av67] [AvGiMa71] .
Watch-dog timers are an effective and popular method of fault
detection. Their principle of operation is relatively simple. Timers are
set to certain values at preestablished points, called checkpoints, in the
programme executed by a module. A timer at a particular checkpoint
counts down while the module performs its function, and is normally
reset before the next checkpoint is reached. However, a software bug or
a hardware fault will prevent the programme from resetting the timer.
The timer then issues an interrupt command which causes automatic
switch over to a spare module. The Pluribus system [KaEt78] makes
substantial use of watch-dog timers. The console processor of VAX
11/780 also uses a watch-dog timers. After the detection of a fault in
one of the modules it should be switched out, but one should
determine whether the fault is transient or permanent, otherwise a
good module may be removed because of a temporary fault. Therefore
the retry technique should be used to prevent any fault-free module
being switched out.
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3.6.5 - Some examples of dynamic redundancy techniques.
An example of using only one spare is duplex system. In this system
there are two modules in parallel with either module acting as a
standby. A matching circuit continuously compares the outputs of two
modules and interprets any mismatch as a fault in either of the
modules or in the matching circuit itself. After the detection of a
mismatch, diagnostic programmes are run to locate the fault. If the
fault is in a module, it is taken off-line and the normal operation is
resumed as a simplex system. The reliability of a duplex system is
increased if a faulty module is repaired and returned to operation
(repairable duplex system). Examples of duplex configuration are the
Bell Electronic Switching Systems (ESS) [To 781, and the AXE
telephone exchange system [OsJo 801. In the No.1 Electronic Switching
System (ESS) the reliability objective is that the system down time
should not exceed two hours over its forty years life. Another example
of dynamic redundancy is a multi processor system proposed by IBM,
in [ IBM 80].
3.6.6 - Hybrid Redundancy Technique
The combination of static redundancy and Dynamic redundancy is
called Hybrid redundancy. In this case the core of system is TMR ( or
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NMR in general) with a voting circuitry and also there are a few spares
which can replace any faulty module in the core [GoGrLe67] [BoCaRo67]
[MaAv70].
Fig 3.3 shows this configuration.
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Fig . 3.3 A hybrid structure with a TMR core and two spares
The "disagreement detector" (D) detects whether the system output is
different from the output of any TMR module. If there is any failure in
TMR, then the faulty module will be replaced by a good spare module
by the switch. If all the spares are used up, we will have a TMR system.
The maximum number of fault that can be tolerated simultaneously is
n = ( (N-1 ) / 2) N is the number of modules in the core
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e.g. with a TMR core and 2 spares the system can tolerate only one error
n.(3-1)/2.1
3.7 - Choosing between TMR and Standby Sparing
Designing systems for standby sparing environments is far more
difficult than designing for TMR, since the extra checking and
reconfiguration circuitry of sparing is far more complex than the
voting circuitry used in TMR.
TMR is often the best in short missions
Hybrid is better for longer missions
3.8 - Responsive Redundancy Techniques
There is a fourth group of hardware redundancy structures which have
been proposed in the last 2 decades and do not quite fit in any of the
three categories already mentioned [SoMa78]. In the static redundancy
structure there is a voting mechanism that v& es on the outputs of its
N channels, and there is generally no detection and switching circuits.
In standby sparing and hybrid techniques there should be a few spare
units ready to replace any active faulty module. The spares may be
passive before replacement. In a responsive redundant structure all
modules are active at the beginning of the mission time. However,
there is a detection and switching mechanism to detect and reconfigure
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the structure upon the occurrence of a failure so that the contribution
of the faulty module is reduced or eliminated. In the following sections
we describe a few of this class of redundancy schemes.
3.9 - Self-Purging Redundancy Scheme
A Self-purging redundancy structure is formed from a set of P identical
modules, a disagreement detector and a very simple switch for each
module[Lo76]. The outputs of these switches are connected to a
threshold voter with a threshold M and a weight of one for each input.
Fig 3.4 shows a block diagram of a basic self-purging system.
Fig. 3.4 Self-Purging Redundancy Scheme
The voter is a threshold voter and it produces logic I if the weighted
sum of its inputs is equal to or greater than the threshold level M. It
produces logic 0 otherwise. When a failure occurs at the output of a
module, this can be detected by the disagreement detectors
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system output
implemented in the switch elements. Then a logic value of '0' will be
assigned to the output of the faulty module. This is logically equivalent
to disconnecting the faulty module from the voter. Suppose that we
have a self-purging system with five modules and the threshold of the
voter is 3 ( M = 3). The voter output Z is
Z =m1[m2(m3+m4+m5)+m3(m4+m5)+m4m5]
+m 2 [m 3 (m 4 +m 5 )+ m 4 m 5 ]+m 3 m 4 m 5
	3.1
Where m1 ... m 5
 are the outputs of the modules. The system will
operate properly if there are three or more fault-free modules.
The switching system for the self-purging structure is very simple: this
is an advantage of this scheme over the hybrid technique. It consists of .
an EXCLUSIVE-OR gate, a flip-flop, and an AND gate for each module.
The switch is shown in Fig. 3.5 .
Retry
Reset
	
I 
S
FF
CL
Fig. 3.5 A switch of self-purging sc:leme
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When the first failure occurs, the EX-OR will detect the disagreement
between the voter output and the AND gate output, and resets the
flip-flop at the next clock pulse and forces the output of the AND gate
to be stuck-at-0 . That is the module will not contribute to the voter
any more. After the first disagreement between the voter and a
module's output, the module will be retried by setting the flip-flop.
Therefore if the failure is not permanent, the module can be used
again, otherwise it can be removed and repaired or replaced by a good
module. This is a very simple switching circuit. System reliability
increases as the complexity of switching circuit decreases. The
complexity of each individual switch does not increase as the number
of modules increases, but the voter complexity increases. This is
reversed in systems using hybrid structure. In hybrid systems the
voter complexity does not increase ( as long as the number of modules
in the core is fixed ), as the number of modules increases but the
complexity of the switching circuit increases rapidly with the number
of spares. The disadvantage of self-purging systems over hybrid systems
is that , in self-purging all modules are active, therefore, power
consumption is higher, also the probability of active module failure is
higher than the probability of failure of passive modules ( spare
modules in hybrid systems ). That is
X > 11 where X is failure rate for active modules and
g is failure rate for passive modules
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However for missions ranging from on-tenth to a few tenths of
module mean-life, self - purging redundancy is the best solution.
Because for such small missions, the beneficial effect of large dormancy
factors can not be taken advantage of significantly. Self - purging
systems also can be made to tolerate more multiple failures.
For large mission times ( T > 1 ), stand-by systems are more successful
due to the use of dormancy factors for its spares. But of course for very
short missions NMR is always the best choice, because there is no
switching and detection circuits in NMR.
3.10 - Sift - Out Modular Redundancy
In this structure the system consists of L identical channels, where L
can be any integer. The channels are synchronised with one another
and perform simultaneous operations[SoMa78]. A comparison is made
at the channels' outputs. If a channel fails, its output will be different
from the other channels' outputs and it will be sifted out and its
contribution to the system output will be terminated. Then the system
becomes an ( L - 1 ) redundancy scheme. If another failure occurs, the
process repeats itself. This structure can tolerate up to L - 2 failures.
That is if L - 2 channels fail, the system still will operate correctly. But
when the number of channels reduces to two and another failure
occurs, the system can not detect it.
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Figure 3.6 shows the block diagram of this structure.
Em 1)L
Fig. 3.6 The block diagram for the Sift Out Redundancy Scheme
The comparator is a set of EXCLUSIVE OR gates which check the
outputs of the channels against each other. The comparator circuit
diagram for three channel SMR is shown in Fig. 3.7.
D E12
FD E23
D3
	 I	 D  E13
Fig 3.7 The Comparator circuit diagram CL = 3 )
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The detector is implemented by NOR gates and flip _ flops ,as shown
in fig. 3.8 for a three channel SMR. The number of NOR gates is
E( 21- ) + L ] .
E12
E23
1
31 Q1
Ki Fl
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F 3
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Retry/Reset
Fig. 3.8 The logic diagram of the Detector circuit ( L = 3 )
The flip -flops provide the reset / retry facilities. Suppose that channel i
is fault free at time t, then F would have the logic value of 0 . But
when this channel fails F becomes 1 . For example if channel 1 fails,
the EXCLUSIVE - OR's detect the disagreement and cause the lines E12
and E13 to be logic 1 . Then line Fl will be stuck-at-1 and the
corresponding flip-flop will force it to hold the logic 1 . The retry
procedure makes the structure tolerant to temporary faults. The next
block in this structure is the collector. Its logic diagram is shown in
Fig.3.9. It consists of ( L + 1) NOR gates. Each fault-free channel
•••••
provides a D i , and each faulty channel provides a logic 0 input to the
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last NOR gate in this block.
Fig. 3.9 The Collector logic diagram for L =3
The output of the system is the output of this gate and it is correct if at
least two of the L channels are operating correctly.
3.11 - Comparison with other systems
3.11.1 - Comparing SMR with TMR
A Sift-out Modular Redundancy system with three channels has the
same fault tolerance as a TMR system. Because at least two channels are
required to operate correctly to produce the correct output, there is no
need to sift a failed channel out, and therefore the three channels sift
out structure can be simplified as shown in fig. 3.10 . This scheme has
the capability of automatic fault diagnosis. For example if channel i
fails, the output variable F in the detector circuit is set to logic 1.
This is an important advantage over TMR in commercial computers,
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because it shows which module is faulty and eases maintenance and
improves the availability of the system.
Fig. 3.10 Sift-out redundancy with three channels
3.11.2 - Comparing with NMR
The fault tolerance of an SMR with N channels is ( N - 2 ), but the fault
tolerance of an NMR system is ( N - 1 ) / 2. When N is small, the voter
for NMR is less complex than sift - out checking unit, but the situation
is the reversed as N increases.
52
3.11.3 - Comparing with hybrid scheme
Sift-out redundancy has the same fault tolerance or even higher fault
tolerance than hybrid configuration. We will compare their reliabilities
in the next chapter.
3.11.4 - Comparison with self-purging technique
When L, the number of channels is small the sift-out structure can be
implemented with less gates and elements than the self-purging
system. For example, a three channel self-purging structure needs three
flip-flops, three EXCLUSIVE - OR gates and seven elementary gates,
where the SMR requires only thirteen elementary gates. For L > 3 the
self - purging has a less complex switch.
3.12 - Summary
To summarise this chapter, reliability of computing systems may be
'
enhanced by fault prevention (i.e. elimination of faults through design
and manufacturing considerations) or by employing redundancy to
tolerate both the faults which are built into the system and become
active during its operation and those which develop later.
Fault-tolerant computing is in no way a new discipline (it began in the
design of the earliest computers), and is not an alternative to fault
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prevention but is a complement to it.
Ultra-high reliability and high availability (which are in great demand)
can be achieved by fault-tolerant techniques. The high costs of testing
complex circuits, the relatively low costs of VLSI devices, and the
advances in semiconductor technology ( which has reduced the size of
electronic components and has made room for the application of
redundant hardware ) have all contributed to making the
development of fault-tolerant techniques an alternative way to achieve
high reliability.
After a discussion of fault-tolerant principles, a classification of
redundancy techniques was presented. This is summarised on the table
in the next page.
Finally the most important redundancy techniques (such as TMR,
dynamic, hybrid, and responsive redundancy structures) were
discussed for the purpose of comparisons with the new designs which
will be presented in the next chapter.
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CHAPTER FOUR
NEW FAULT TOLERANT DESIGNS 
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4.1 - Introduction
In this chapter two new fault-tolerant techniques will be proposed, but
first a fault-tolerant structure which has recently been proposed will be
discussed and improved upon.
As shown in the earlier chapters Triple Modular Redundancy (TMR) is
the best scheme for short mission times ( e.g. a few tenths of the
MTBF ) , but not necessarily for situations in which high reliability is
required through out a long life time or at the end of a mission time.
For long missions, structures with higher numbers of modules may be
more appropriate. Dynamic or hybrid structure often provide better
service but they run a cost and area overhead. One of the redundancy
techniques which performs remarkably well is a hardware
reconfiguration scheme proposed by Su and DuCasse [SuDuCa80]. The
structure and behaviour of Su and DuCasse design with 5 modules will
be discussed and compared with other five channel redundancy
structures . This configuration does not operate correctly with seven
modules (contrary to the claim made by the authors). We will
introduce an improved version this structure which has fewer gates
and operates correctly even with seven redundant modules. An
investigation for the maximum number of failures that can be
tolerated by each structure will be made.
Fault-tolerant schemes may be divided into two classes when switching
and reconfiguration mechanisms are required. In the first group the
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complexity of the voter is constant, but the switch complexity is
increased significantly ( exponentially ) with the number of modules in
the system. Examples of this class include hybrid structures and basic
dynamic structures without voters. In the second group the switch
complexity is increased linearly with the number of modules, but the
voter complexity is increased exponentially. An example of this class is
the Highly Reliable - Highly Efficient structure which will be presented
in this chapter. As the structure of the voters in systems using
fault-tolerant techniques are more regular and straight forward than
the structure of the switches in these systems, and as it is possible to
implement highly reliable voters, using space-efficient techniques such
as symmetric switching circuits, the second group seems more
promising than the first. Two designs in the second group will be
proposed in the last sections of this chapter and their advantages and
disadvantages will be discussed. The reliability calculation for these
structures will be discussed in the later chapters.
4.2 - 5MR Reconfigurable Scheme
In this section we describe a reconfiguration scheme [SuDuCa80] which
can tolerate a double fault followed by a single failure; this can be
tolerated by neither a 5MR nor a Hybrid (3,2) redundant system with a
TMR core. In the next section we will describe some improvements on
this design.
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Let us consider a system with 5 identical modules (5MR). The outputs
of these modules are binary variables xi 's (i=1,...,5) which are
connected to a majority gate. The output of the majority gate is given
by equation ( 4.1).
Z = M ( Xi, X2, X3, X4, X5 )
= Xi(X2 ( X3 + X4 + X5 ) + X3 ( X4 + X5 ) + X4 X5 ) +
(X2 ( X3 ( X4 + X5 ) + X4 X5 ) + X3 X4 X5	 ( 4.1 )
substituting X1=0 and X2=1 into the above expression, we obtain
Z = M ( 0, 1, X3, X4, X5 ) = X4 X5 + X3 X4 + X3 X5
Z = M( X3, X4, X5 )	 ( 4.2 )
Therefore a TMR system can be obtained by substituting any variable by
0 and any other variable by 1. If we substitute 0 and 1 for the
appropriate variables when a single or double fault occurs, the system
will be reconfigured to a TMR system. A block diagram for a system
that can do these substitutions (and reconfigure the system) is given in
Fig. 4.1.
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y•• al
ZX1
M a.X5 B	 0(5:
Fig. 4.1 The structure of the 5MR reconfiguration scheme
Block A consists of five "equivalence detectors" and five SR flip-flops.
Each detector has two inputs x i and z and one output g i , where
i=1,2,...,5. Suppose that one of the modules, say module i is faulty, then
the logical value of the voter output (z) and the module output x i will
be different, and therefore g i will have value 1. The logic diagram of
block A is shown in Fig. 4.2.
xl	 x2 x3
	 x4 x5
Z
clock
	
1	 I	 I	 I 	 Reset
[
	
R	 IS II IS R	
R	 	F  F  FF "IM
	
I	 i
	
I I	 li	 1
0-°92i2g3i3g4-64015
Fig. 4.2 The Disagreement Detection circuit ( Block A).
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Initially all the RS flip- flops are reset. If all the modules are fault
free, gi = 0 (1=1,...,5) the network B transmits X i 's to a i 's for
(i=1,...,5).
Block B is shown in Fig. 4.3. It consists of 5 sub-blocks Bi (i=1,5) and
each sub-block Fig. 4.4, consists of 5 gates. The design of block B is such
that if module i is faulty g i = 1 and a i becomes stuck-at-0 ( s-a-0 ).
Then a i+i (mod. 5) is forced to become s-a-1 (stuck-at-1) temporarily
and the remaining a i 's being unaffected by the flip- flops, allow the
X i to transfer to a
gs
1_1:1 IB2 ItBj 3	
B4 F131.
	
1	 .	 1	 I	 I 
xl	 x3ix4i
	
al	 a2 a3
	 a4 a5
gl
Fig. 4.3 The Switch ( Block B ) which consists of five sub-blocks Bi.
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9'9 (1-2)
mode 5
Fig. 4.4 The logic diagram for each switch element ( Bi). .
The expression for a i is shown in equation 4.3.
a i = g i _ i E gk + X i g i +g i g i _ 2
	( 43)
k pi-1, i
To verify the above equation for single and multiple faults let us
consider the following cases:
Case 1 - System with a single fault
Suppose that module 1 is faulty. Hence gi = 1 and g i = 0 (i=2,5),
substituting these values into equation (4.3) we obtain
a 1 =g5 (g2 + g3 + g4 ) + X rg i + gig4
al = 0 + 0 + 0
al = 0, a2 = 1 and al = X i	 for i = 3, 4, 5
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Thus the 5MR system is reconfigured to a TMR with module 2 as a
spare.
Case 2 - System with Double fault
There are two possibilities to be considered in this case:
a) Non-adjacent double fault.
If modules 1 and 4 are faulty, then gi =m =1 and g2=g3 =g5=0. Using
equation (4.3) we obtain a 1=1, a2=X, a 3=X3, a4=3, and a5=X5 .
Therefore, the system reconfigures into a TMR .
b) Adjacent double fault.
If modules 1 and 2 are faulty, then gi =g2=1 and g3=g4=g5=0.
Substituting them into equation (4.3), we obtain 044, a 2=1, and
a3 = X3, a4 = X4, a5 = X5. The system reconfigures to a TMR again.
Case 3 - System with Treble fault.
If the third module now fails, the system will change the majority gate
in the TMR to an OR or an AND gate. This is shown below.
a) If module 3 fails after module 1 and 4 have already failed, then
gi=g3=g4=1 and g2=g5=0, using the equation 4.3 we obtain
a1 =1, a2= X2, a3 =1, a4
 =0, and a5
 = X5. hence Z= X2 +X5
that is the majority gate is changed to an OR gate and therefore the
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fourth failure can be tolerated if it is s-a-O
b) Similarly if module 2 or 5 fails the TMR system will be reconfigured
to an AND gate. Then the fourth failure can be tolerated if it is s-a-1.
4.3 - Comparison with other similar schemes
The above scheme operates well when the number of modules is five.
Table 4.1 shows a comparison between the number of faults that can be
tolerated by this scheme, a five modular redundancy ( 5MR ) , and a
hybrid with a TMR core and two spares H(3,2) . The circuit realisation
of this structure is simpler than many other similar designs .
Faults
Effect on
proposed Scheme
Effect on
5 M R
Effect on
Hybrid ( 3 , 2 )
1 Reconfigure to TMR None None
2 simultaneously Reconfigure to TMR None Failure
2 in sequence Reconfigure to TMR None None
2 simultaneously,
followed by 1
OR gate or AND gate, OK Failure Failure
3 in sequence OR gate or AND gate, OK Failure None
I followed by 2 Failure Failure Failure
3 simultaneously Failure Failure Failure
4 after surviving 3
s - a - 1
OK if AND gate
( 50% of time )'
Failure failure
s - a -0 OK if OR gate Failure Failure
( 50% of time )
Table 4.1
The number of gates used by the detection circuit and the switch is less
than either the iterative cell switch scheme presented by [SiMc731, or
self-purging redundancy [L076]. The structure of the switching
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mechanism is highly regular, as all the sub-blocks Bi's shown in Fig. 4.3
are repeated for i from 1 to 5 as are the disagreement detection circuits.
This regularity is another advantage of the scheme, as it reduces the
manufacturing cost , and makes the testing of the circuit easier .
However the complexity of the switching circuit , and the voter,
increases with the number of modules ( N > = 7 ) .
In the next section an improved version of Su and DuCasse's scheme
will be presented.
4.4 - Design Improvement
The design improvement is proposed for the following reasons.
I - Anticipating the implementation of the logic with hardware
however, it is important to implement the circuit requiring fewest
number of gates. As a rule in digital circuits, if we have fewer gates, the
cost will be lower, the yield will be higher, the heat produced will be
less, the area used will be less, the power consumption will be reduced,
and the reliability will be increased. Therefore we propose another
scheme which uses the same idea as the 5MR reconfigurable system
but requires fewer gates for the implementation of block B. In the case
of a single fault there is no need to force the output of one of the fault
free modules to be s-a-1. Only in the case of a double fault, the output of
one of the faulty modules must be s-a-O and the output of the other
faulty module must be s-a-1. Then the reconfigured system is a perfect
65
TMR and can tolerate the next failure, and then the majority gate
becomes an AND gate or an OR gate after occurrence of another failure.
II - With reference to the equation 4.3 , the Su and DuCasse's scheme
develops a problem when the number of modules is seven ( N = 7),
and multiple failures occurring as in the following example:
Let us assume that there are seven identical modules , and modules
ml , m2, and m5 fail , Thus
g1 = g2 = g5 = 1 and g3 = g4 = gs = g7 = 0 •	 -
Substituting these values into the equation 4.3 , we obtain
oc i = g 7 ( g2 + g3 + g4 + g5 + g6 ) +X 1 + g1g6
a1 = 0 + 0 + 0 =0
	 also	 a2 = as = 0
a3
 = X3	 a4 = X4	 a6 = X6 And a7 = X7
Now if the fourth failure happens to be stuck-at-0, the output of the
majority gate will be 0 , irrespective of the output values of the other
fault free modules, since there are already three inputs of 0, to the
voter.
Therefore the 7MR Reconfiguration structure can not tolerate more
than three failures if they occur as above. It should be noticed that a
basic 7MR without any extra mechanisms for switching and
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g (i+2)
g1
g(11)
g1
x i
1(1+1)
g (i-2)
mode 5
disagreement detection circuits will tolerate any three failures. Hence
the validity of the scheme presented by Su and DuCasse is called into
question when the number of modules is greater than five.
However in the improved scheme, ai is computed by equation 4.4.
The switch will be implemented with fewer gates than we used in the
original design suggested by Su and DuCasse,
a i = gi g i _i g i+2 + X i g i + g i g 1.2 g i .1 	 (4.4)
The logical diagram of sub-block 131 is shown in Fig. 4.5.
Fig. 4.5 The switch element for the improved version.
The NOR gate and one of the AND gates in Fig. 4.4 are replaced by only
a single three input AND gate in Fig. 4.5.
Now to verify equation (4.4) , we consider the following cases :
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- System with a single fault
Suppose that module 1 is faulty, then gi =1 and g 1=0 for(i=2,5).
Substituting these values in equation (4.4) we obtain:
- -	 -
ai =gi gs g 3 + X i g i + gi g4 g2	 a1= 0 + 0 + 0
al = 0, and with the same procedure a2= X2, a3 = X3, oc4 . X4,
and a5 =X5.
Thus the system reconfigures to a 4MR.
Z = M (0, X2, X3, X4, X5)
- System with double fault.
a) Non-adjacent double fault.
Suppose modules 1 and 4 fail. Then substituting gi =g4
 =1 and
g2=g3=g5=0 into equation (4.4) we obtain
- - -
a = g i gs g 3 + X i g i + g i g4 g 2I	 thus	 a 1 = 0 + 0 + 1=1
- -	 -
and a4 =g4 g3 g 5 + X 4 g4 + g4 g2 g5 SO	 a 4 = 0 + 0 + 0=0
Similarly a2 = X2, a3 = X3, and a5 = X5.
Therefore the system successfully reconfigures to a TMR.
b) Adjacent double fault
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If modules 1 and 2 fail, i.e. gi =g2 =1 and g3=g4=g5=0 , with the same
procedure al
 =0, a2 =1, a3 = X3, a4 = X4, and a5 = X5. So
Z = M (0, 1, X3, X4, X5 ) , ( see equation 4.2) . The system changes to
a perfect TMR.
- System with treble fault
Suppose the third module fails. For example if module three fails after
failure of module land 4 in case ( 2-a ) , then gi = g3 = g4 = 1 and
g2 = g5 = 0 .
By using equation (4.4) we obtain:
=1, a2
 = X2, a3
 = 0 , a4
 =0, and a5 = X5
Also from equation ( 4.1) , we obtain Z= X2 . X5, that is the majority
gate is changed to an AND gate and the fourth failure can be tolerated if
it is stuck-at-i. Similarly if module 2 or 5 fails we get Z = X3 .X5 or
Z= X2 +X3 respectively, which similarly changes the majority gate to
an AND or a OR gate respectively and hence, the fourth failure can be
tolerated if it is stuck-at-1 or stuck-at-0 respectively.
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All the possible cases have been investigated for both N = 5 and N = 7
modules and it seems the above realisation will function correctly with
all the failure cases discussed in this chapter. Appendix A will show
the results.
In the schemes discussed so far in this chapter ,with N = 5 , the
number of faults that can be tolerated is greater than 5MR (five
Modular Redundancy), and Hybrid(3,2) (a TMR core and two spares). If
only one of the modules fails, the system reconfigures to a TMR in the
scheme proposed by Su and DuCasse and to a 4MR in the improved
version . Then they can tolerate the 3rd failure and the majority gate is
changed to an AND gate or an OR gate. The fourth failure can be
tolerated half of the time.
In the improved version though the structure of the switch is more
regular, it uses fewer gates than the switch in the scheme proposed by
Su and DuCasse [SuDuCa80]. Only four gates (three AND gates and one
OR gate) are used for each sub-block Bi , compared to five gates used in
Su and DuCasse's scheme.
Another important result is that the improved version of the
structure discussed above offers higher fault-tolerance than the original
scheme by Su and DuCasse with N = 7 .
70
4.5 - Multiple Fault-Tolerant Reconfigurable Structure
This section presents a new fault-tolerant structure [HaZi89] for
increasing system reliability and fault-tolerance by adding redundant
hardware. In this scheme a new switching circuit is designed. The
system operates with very accurate timing. A D-type flip-flop is used
to synchronise the circuit and prevent oscillation. An equation for
the switch function will be derived and verified in the case of five
modules and single or multiple failures.
4.5.1 - The Realisation of the Proposed Structure
The proposed scheme can be realised with N identical modules, a
switching circuit , a disagreement detection circuit, and a majority
voter . The structure reconfigures itself after the occurrence of failures
and it can tolerate multiple faults which will be described later. The
block diagram for the Multiple Fault-Tolerant Reconfigurable Structure
(MFT-RS) with five modules is the similar to the 5MR reconfigurable
scheme shown in Fig. 4.1.
Let us consider such a system as mentioned above. The outputs of the
five modules are binary variables (xi to xs )., as in the previous
structures. They are connected to a majority gate, the output of the
majority gate will be given by equation 4.1 , as defined in section 4. 2
The disagreement detection circuit consists of five "equivalence
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detectors" and one D-type flip-flop. Each detector has two inputs x i
and Q which holds the logical value of the voter output (z), and one
output d i , where i=1,2,...,5. Thus the structure of the disagreement
detection circuit is similar to the detection circuit (Block A) in the 5MR
reconfigurable scheme discussed in section 4.2 The difference is the
application of the flip flops . Instead of the five R-S flip flops in the
5MR reconfiguration scheme, only one D-type flip flop is used as
shown in Fig. 4.6. The advantage is that N, R-S flip flops are replaced
by only one D-type flip flop. However logic value I will appear at the
output of any EXCLUSIVE- OR (di) when a disagreement occurs
between the system output (Z) and the module output (Xi) . The initial
requirement is that the flip flop and Xi's are set to 0. When all the
modules operating correctly, di = 0 , for all values of i from I to N.
Thus the modules' outputs will be transmitted to the voter without
any change, that is Vi = Xi (for i = I to i = N ). In our description N = 5.
dk
xl	 x2	 x3 .
	
x4	 x5
i 
11,
 16 16 16 16, QD-FF
dl	 d2	 d3	 •d4
	 d5	 Z
Fig 4.6 The logic diagram of disagreement detection circuit.
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Similar to the previous structure, the switch forces the output of the
faulty module, which is connected to the voter, to logic 0 . This is
logically equivalent to disconnecting a failed module from the voter.
That is if module i is faulty di = 1, Vi= 0, and Vi = Xj ( for j =1 to N
and j is not equal to i ) .
The logic diagram of the switch is illustrated in Fig. 4.7 . With
reference to Fig 4.7, equation 4.5 may be obtained for the outputs of the
switch.
Fig 4.7 The logic diagram for the switch.
i-i
vi=aixi+yi	 where y i = d i I di	for i> 1 and y 1 =0	 (4.5)
Let us consider our familiar cases as before to verify the above
equation. That is testing the structure with a single, or multiple faults.
73
Case 1 System with a single fault
Suppose that module i is faulty. Then di = 1 for (i=1,...,5) and dm = 0
for (m=1,...,5 and not equal to i ), substituting these values into
equation (4.5) we obtain
v i =0, vm = xm . Thus the 5MR system is reconfigured to a
4MR .
Case 2 System with Double fault
If modules i and j are faulty , then di = di = 1 ( for j = 1,...,5 and not
equal to i) and dm
 = 0 for (m = 1,...,5 and not equal to i or j ). There are
two possibilities to be considered in this case:
using equation (4.5) we obtain
I) v i = 0, v i = 1 and vm = xm if kj
	 or
II)v j = 0, v i =1 and vm = xm if j<i .
Thus the system reconfigures to a.TMR.
Case 3 System with Treble fault.
Now if the third module say module k fails after failure of modules i
and j, then di = di = dk = 1 ( k = 1,...,5 and not equal to i or j ) and dm = 0
for (m = 1,...,5 and not equal to i or j or k ) then for k<i and j, vk = 0,
vi= vi = 1 and vm . xm otherwise vk = 1 and v i and v i
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stuck-at-0 and or 1 as in the case 2-I or 2-11 . Then the system
reconfigures to an OR gate ,therefore it tolerates the fourth failure if it
is stuck-at-O.
The conclusion of this scheme is similar to the conclusion of the
previous structure described in section 4. 4. After occurrence of the 3rd
failure, the majority gate will be reconfigured to an OR gate, therefore
a fourth failure will be tolerated if it is a stuck-at-0 fault. It should be
noted that the system with five modules ( N = 5) can not tolerate three
simultaneous failures (this is in contrast to a five modular redundancy
technique with a majority voter). Thus the same table as in section 4.3
may be used for comparison with other similar schemes, apart from
the first and the last lines which should be
a) With a single fault the system reconfigures into a 4MR
b) The majority gate reconfigures into an OR gate only, in the case of
occurring three simultaneous failure. Thus the fourth failure will
be tolerated if it is stuck-at-0 fault.
The number of gates used by the above structure is less than any other
similar structure discussed so far, because only one flip flop is used in
this scheme. The complexity of the switching circuit and detection
circuit increase linearly with the number of modules ( N>. 7) but the
complexity of the voter increases significantly.
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4.6 - A Highly Reliable Highly Efficient Hardware Redundancy
Structure
In this section another fault-tolerant design will be presented [Ha89]
which shows some advantages over other techniques suggested in the
literature, particularly when the number of redundant modules is
seven. Before any discussion about this technique let us consider the
cases that cause system failure in the other schemes with N = 7.
- Basic 7MR can not tolerate more than three failures.
- 7MR Reconfiguration scheme by Su and DuCasse fails with three
modules' failures .
- Hybrid ( TMR core, 4 spares ) fails in cases of 2 simultaneous failure,
or 3 simultaneous failures, or I failure followed by 2 simultaneous
failures.
- Hybrid ( 5MR core, 2 spares ) not only fails in the event of 3
simultaneous failure , but it has a very complex switch as well.
Introduction of the new redundancy technique which will be
presented next, prevents the failure cases which cause system failure in
the above mentioned schemes.
The structure consists of N identical modules, a disagreement detection
circuit, and a newly developed switch which is connected to a majority
voter. All modules are active. In the event of module failures, the
switch forces the logical outputs of the odd faulty modules in the
76
structure to 1 , and the even faulty modules to 0. This process will be
continued until two fault free modules remain, therefore this
configuration tolerates up to ( N - 2) module failures. It may tolerate
the (N - 1)th failure if it is stuck at 0 fault. The implementation of the
structure is very easy and highly regular. It shows several advantages
over the existing redundancy techniques.
4.7 - Realisation of the Highly Reliable Highly Efficient Structure
(HR-HE)
To describe the scheme let us consider a system with N identical
modules where N is an odd number. The block diagram of this scheme
is shown in Fig. 4.8.
Clk
D-1—c-ilay - Disagreement Detection
circuit
Q1
• •	 II
xi
Switching circuit
• Majority
voter
	 Ir.
output
xn
Fig. 4.8 The block diagram for the proposed scheme
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The disagreement detection circuit consists of N "equivalence
detectors" and is similar to the detection circuit shown in Fig 4.2 for the
5MR reconfigurable scheme.
In this presentation we refer to the module numbers starting from left,
as in Fig. 4.9. Initially all R-S flip flops in the disagreement detection
circuit are reset. If all the modules are fault-free, di = 0 ( i =1 to n).
Therefore
Qi =0, Qi =1 (i=1 to n )
and the switch transmits x i 's to v i 's and the majority gate outputs
the majority of the n inputs.
The important feature of this structure is that the switch forces the odd
faulty modules to stuck-at-1 and the even faulty modules to be
stuck-at-0. Therefore the output of the majority voter will not be
affected when there are one or more pairs of faulty modules in the
system. Assume that the voter and reconfiguration circuit are
fault-free.
The switch is shown in Fig. 4.9. It consists of N identical switch
components as marked by the doted lines in the figure.
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a switch 1 —	 — 1
component'
 I	 Qn I
i	 I
•
1 xi—irt cell ni 1
i	 I
ln
Q1 $32 402
i cal I_H ce112 kip. •
majority
voter
• • •
i systemoutput
• a	 0
Fig. 4.9 The switch structure
There is one cell in each switch component, and each cell has two
inputs ( Qi and K1 _1 for the ith cell ). Fig. 4.10 illustrates the logic
diagram for each cell.
iQi
fiD	
6
If Yi
Fig. 4.10 The cell logic diagram
The Q input indicates whether the related module is faulty (Q1 = 1), or
fault free (Q i = 0). The other input indicates whether any odd number
of failures occurred in the preceding modules ( K1_1 = 1 ) or not
Ki
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(Km= 0). Therefore there are four possibilities to be considered for each
cell. Table 4.2 shows the possible logic values of the outputs for each
cell.
Input Output
Q i K 1 1
o
1
o
I
o
o
1
1
o
1
o
o
o
1
1
o
Table 4.2. The table illustrate the behaviour of cell I
Referring to the logic diagram in figures 4.9 and 4.10 Ki and yi may be
obtained by equation (4.6)
K = Qie K-1	 where	 Ko =0
	
(4.6)
yi = Qi . Ki
Finally the outputs of the switch are connected to a majority gate.Using
the above equation Vi may be expressed as in equation 4.7.
Vi = Yi + ( Xi. Qi )	 ( 4.7 )
To verify the above equation for single and multiple faults let us
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consider a system with five identical modules using the above
structure. However the system should be able to tolerate at least three
failures. Consider the following cases:
Case 1 - System with a single fault
Suppose that module 1 is faulty. Hence d1 = 1 and di = 0 (i=2 to 5),
substituting these values into equations ( 4.6 ) and ( 4.7 ) we obtain
1(1 = Qi 0 KO = 1 + 0 = 1 where	 1(0 = 0
y1 = Q1 . K1 = 1 . 1 = 1
and Vi = Y1 + ( Xi . Qi ) = 1 + ( X1 . 0 ) thus Vi = 1
Following the same procedure we obtain
V2 = X2 , V3 = X3 , V4 = X4 , and V5 = X5
Therefore the correct output can be obtained by the majority voter.
Case 2 - System with Double fault
If modules 1 and 3 are faulty, then d1 = d3 = 1 and d2 = c14 = d5 = 0.
Using equations ( 4.6 ) and ( 4.7 )we obtain V1 = 1, V2 = X2, V3 = 0,
V4 = X4 , and V5 = X5 .Therefore, the system reconfigures into a TMR
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and the correct output is obtained.
Case 3 - System with Treble fault.
Suppose that module 4 fails after failure of modules 1 and 3. Using the
same procedure we have d1=d3=d4=1 and d2=d5=0, and we obtain:
V1 =1, V2 = X2, V3 =0, V4 =1, and V5 = X5. hence Z= X2 +X5.
That is the system is reconfigured into an OR gate thus any fourth
failure may be tolerated if it is stuck at 0 fault ( s-a-0 ). The reset and
retry facilities for the flip-flops may be used to deal with transition
failures.
4.8 - Highly Reliable Highly Efficient Structure (HR-HE Structure)
compared with other fault-tolerant designs.
HR-HE Structure has a few advantages over the other designs.
Supposing that we have a system consisting of five modules as
described in the earlier example. If we compare this system with a five
Modular Redundant structure ( 5MR ), the number of failures that the
HR - HE scheme can tolerate is at least (N-2) i.e. 3, while the number of
failures tolerated by 5MR is 2. This is a good advantage particularly
when N>5.
Comparison of this scheme with a hybrid consisting of a TMR core and
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two spares,H(3,2) (with an iterative switch design ) [SiMc73] shows that
H(3,2) will fail in the presence of two simultaneous failure but HR-HE
structure will survive.
Another advantage of HR - HE structure over many other similar fault
tolerant designs is the simplicity of its switch. The number of gates
used to implement the switch is less than those used in switches in
some other schemes such as the iterative cell array switch in hybrid
redundancy, the switch in the 5MR tecsmfigurabie scheme by
[SuDuCa80] , and the switch in the sift-out redundancy [SoMa 78].
In the above scheme if only one of the modules fails, the output of that
module is stuck at 1, but the majority gate votes correctly on the inputs
that it receives. In the case of two module failing the output of the first
faulty module is stuck-at-1 and the other stuck at 0. For more module
failures this process repeats, until the system reconfigures into a TMR
structure . When the system is in the TMR state, it can tolerate at least
one more failure, and it reconfigures into an OR gate. Then the next
failure may be tolerated if it is s-a-O fault.
The number of faults that the proposed scheme with N modules can
tolerate is greater than that tolerated by NMR (N Modular
Redundancy) or Hybrid (3, N-3) [that is a hybrid with a TMR core and
N-3 spares]. or the other schemes discussed previously. Diagrams 4.11
and 4.12 show a comparison between this scheme, ( using five
redundant modules or seven redundant modules ), with the other
techniques named in the diagrams.
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Finally the structure of the switching mechanism is highly regular.
Therefore manufacturing cost is less and circuit testing is easier. The
complexity of the voter increases significantly when the number of
modules is grater than 5 ( N > 5 ), but this is not a disadvantage, as it is
possible to implement these majority gates, using symmetric switch
arrays on IC's. Therefore the HR-HE scheme appears to be more
effective than similar designs especially when N>5.
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4.9 - Summary
This chapter has discussed a recently published fault-tolerant technique
(5MR Reconfigurable Scheme) [SuDuCa80] and the disadvantages of
this technique were shown, particularly when the number of modules
is greater than five.
A new design which uses fewer gates in the switch structure than the
above scheme was presented. Decreasing the complexity of the
switching circuit in a system is a useful way of improving reliability. It
was shown that this modified technique has a higher fault-tolerance
than the one proposed by [SuDuCa80].
In this chapter two more new techniques were proposed and their
advantages over other fault-tolerant designs were discussed. The
number of faults that can be tolerated by the different techniques was
shown in the two graphs at the end of the chapter and the priority of
the new techniques to the others was shown.
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RELIABILITY COMPARISON OF Dal-ERNT TECHNIQUES 
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5.1 - Introduction
In the previous chapters we have mostly considered techniques to
increase the fault-tolerance of systems by the application of various
switch designs. Table 5.1 shows the maximum number of faults that
can be tolerated by some of the designs discussed earlier.
TMR NMR Hybrid
H (N-S, S)
Self-	 I Sift - out 1
schemepurging
NMR
Recadig.
1 MFT - RS 1 HR-HE 1
scheme
*
Fauk-tolerance
of
systems
1 N - 1 (N-S)-1+s N -M N-2 N+1 N+1 N-2
2 2 2 2
5	 S=4, 5	 M=2Fault-tolerance
of systems
for N = 7
Not app. 3 4 , S=3
,
4 , M=2 5 4 4 5
* Thereshold of the voter is M
Table 5.1 The maximum number of failures that can be tolerated by the
schemes
At this point we should determine whether it is indeed advantageous
to increase the fault-tolerance of systems. The parameter that we will
consider is the overall reliability of the system. The overall system
reliability is an important factor and it is possible to increase the
fault-tolerance of a system and yet degrade its reliability due to the
addition of a great amount of extra hardware.
However an accurate reliability analysis needs to be done if we are to
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compare different systems. For any analysis, including reliability
analysis, a mathematical model of the system under investigation is
needed. Accurate results, and better understanding of the physical
system, can only be gained by good system modelling . There are many
reasons for system modelling , including prediction of system
behaviour [MaAv70] [Ma71], evaluation of its functions [MaSo75] [Si75],
and better control.
5.2 - Reliability modelling and the Assumptions
In the following , a reliability model known as the classical model
[BoCaJe71] will be used for evaluation of the reliability of a
non-redundant system ( with a given failure rate ), a TMR , an NMR
and a dynamic structure . The reliability curve for each case will be
plotted. Then a new reliability model will be presented and will be
applied to the other fault-tolerant designs discussed in the previous
chapter.
It is important to know the assumptions made in the model since
credibility of the results depends on the model's approximation to the
physical system under investigation. In the work described in this
chapter the failure phenomena were assumed to be known. The failure
rates were also assumed known both with power on and power off.
The modelling was limited to the electronic portion of systems. When
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required, the behaviour of the system in the presence of faults was
assumed known, i.e. the probability of detec don and location of the
resulting signal errors was assumed known, as well as the probability of
successful reconfiguration and recovery.
In addition the following assumptions are made for the classical
model:
- exponential distribution is used for the reliability calculation i.e. the
failure rate X., is constant ( after burn-in period ), thus the reliability of
each module at time t, is given by:
R(t) = exp ( -X t )
- individual module failures in a system are assumed to be
independent, so that the system reliability is the product of the
module reliabilities as shown in equation 2.15 (in the case of
non-redundant system), or will be evaluated by equation 2.16 in
chapter 2 (in the case of a redundant configuration) . For example, in a
system composed of n identical
modules or components with failure rate a.c , the system reliability is
R v. (t) = ( e-Xct )n = e-X sys t , where X = n?.sYs	 c .
- once a module has failed, its output is assumed to always be in error
- a voter failure is assumed to cause the entire system to fail ( if only
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one voter is employed)
5.3 Reliability of a non-redundant system
We begin our analysis with the reliability of a non-redundant system. It
is assumed that the basic module has passed through an extensive
burn-in period, and the failure rate A. is constant, i.e. R(t) = exp ( - A. t).
In fact A. is a function of parameters such as temperature, vibration,
humidity, ... , and of course time. Therefore it is possible to calculate
the reliability of a system with ( X. ) as a function of the above
parameters, but this is not in the scope of our discussion. The
reliability of the system is shown in Fig. 5.1
5.4 - Reliability of a TMR System
As described in section 3.6.1 the first fault-tolerant design and possibly
one of the most popular ones is the TMR structure which is formed by
triplicating a single module and voting on the outputs of the three
modules. Historically and practically TMR is an important redundancy
technique to study. TMR serves as a benchmark against which other
redundancy schemes are often compared [Ma69] [Ma70] [AbSi74]. Thus a
thorough understanding of TMR reliability is necessary.
In addition to the general assumption made in the previous sections,
the reliability of each individual module in a TMR structure is
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assumed to be Rm, and failure of modules are independent of each
other . The model that we use is the classical combinational ( mixture
of series and parallel ) model.
RTmR will be used for the system reliability with a TMR structure, and
Rv for the reliability of the voter. Though for the time being we
assume that the voting circuit does not fail, that is the reliability of the
voter is 1. Hence the reliability of a TMR structure can be determined
as a function of Rm as long as two modules are operating correctly.
Reliability of TMR = Reliability of all three modules working +
Reliability of all but one module working
3	 2
R TmR =R m + 3(1 - R m) . Rm
1
	
R TmR =Ec
3 
j a- Rdi .R (3-0m	 5.1
wa
2	 3
	RThiR =3R m -2Rm	5.2
if R m =e-Xt then RimR=3e- 2Xt -2e- 3Xt
Fig 3.1 illustrates the reliability of a TMR system as a function of time
and compares it with the reliability of its non-redundant module Rm.
Reliability of a TMR system is better than that suggested by the above
equation as the system may continue to operate properly even if two
modules fail. For example if one of the modules is stuck-at-0 and
another is stuck-at-1, the system still produces the correct output.
93
0.8
1.0
N	
0.2
---nan_redund ri:
-- -TIM
' 0.0
o 10 20 30 40 50
Fig. 5.1 - a The reliability of a non-redundant system and a TMR
system as a function of time, are shown for the period
t = 0 to t = 50000 hours.
The failure rate of the basic module is X. = 6 * 10 -5
 failures per hours
Time ( thousands of hours )
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Fig. 5.1 - b The reliability of a non-redundant system and a TMR
system shown for the period t = 0 to t = 20000 hours.
The failure rate of the basic module is A. = 6 * 10 -s
 Mures per hours
Time ( thousands of hours )
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So far we have assumed that the voter is perfect. Now if we consider
the voter reliability as ( Rv ), the system reliability will be
R =Rv( 3 R 2m- 2 R 3m )	 5.3
The reliability of a system with imperfect voter is shown in Fig. 5.2
As mentioned earlier the system will fail whenever the voter fails.
This is one of the important disadvantages of TMR. The solution to
this problem is to triplicate the voters (as well as the modules) up to
the last stage. At the last stage we have to accept this setback and
therefore use a highly reliable voter [AbSi74]. Fig. 5.3 illustrates this
structure.
cell 1
Fig. 5.3 The TMR structure is applied to voters as well as the modules.
R ca= (Rm
 R v ) 3 + 3 (Rm R v ) 2 ( 1 - R m R v
 )
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Using equation 5.3 for the reliability of a TMR (basic) the overall
system reliability can be obtained by
R us = [ RTha (basic) 1 . [ R coif'
where n is the number of cells used in the system
Rcell > R (basic TMR )	 if 2 Rm Rv  3 - 2 Rm
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Fig. 5.2 The reliability of :1 TMR system as a function of time , using
different imperfect voters. Note that the reliability of the
system will not be improved if IC is less than 0.89.
Time period is from t=0 to t= 20000 hours
The failure rate of the basic module is 2i, = 6* 10 -5 failures per hours
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Another problem with the TMR is if a module fails in a TMR system,
both the remaining modules must continue to operate correctly to
ensure that the system will operate correctly, so after the first failure
the reliability of the system is less than that of an individual module.
e.g. after the first failure
2	 2
R TmR----> R. and R.< R. because 0< R.< 1
therefore the reliability will be improved if one of the working
modules is switched off after a fault occurs. A system that consists of a
TMR with a swicth-off mechanism is called TMR / simplex [BaHa69].
The overall system reliability of a TMR/simplex for a mission time T
is
R(T)
(0<=t<=T)
3	 3	 3
=	 R(T)
	 +	 yiRm(T)-Rm(T)1
The above equation is obtained as follows:
The probability that all the modules will survive the mission time T is
(Rm)3
 . If one of the modules fails at some time t and that module is
removed together with one of the remaining good modules and the
system (with only one of the fault-free modules) operates correctly for
the rest of the mission time (T-t), then the probability of this event
happens is
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Td	 -2At	 -A(r-t)	 3
1 in3 .1. [(	 -Ata (1-e ))e	 .e	 idt=yR-R3m1
Jo
Therefore
3	 3	 3R simpie,c =R m + 1.5 R m - 1.5 R m = 1.5 R m - 0.5 Rm
The last equation shows that the reliability will be increased by
switching off one of the good modules after occurrence of the first
failure.
N.B. We can switch off the voter and make a direct connection, e.g. by
forcing one of the good modules to be stuck-at-I and the faulty module
to be stuck-at-0.
Two major points should be noticed by the designer of a TMR system.
1) If Rm < 0.5 then RTmR < Rm even with a perfect voter i.e. Rv = 1
2) If Rv < 0.89 then RTmR < Rm	irrespective of the value of Rm.
Fig. 5.2 illustrates these points.
The above values may be obtained mathematically as follows:
for the TMR structure should to increase the system reliability, we
need Rsys > Rm , that is
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*R
(3R 2m-2R 3m) Rv > R m	5.4
Assume that the voter is perfect i.e. Rv = 1 . Thus equation 5.4 can be
written as follows:
2	 3	 2 3	 13R m-2R m - R m >0 or - 2R m (R m - iRm+-i)>0
1
- 2R m ( R m - y)(Rm-1)>0
That is for values of Rm . 0 ,
 Rm = 1/2, or Rm = 1 the term on the left
side of inequality sign ( denoted by R*) is zero. The solution to the
above inequality is shown in the following table.
0
	 1/2	 1
0	 0	 10
solution
That is the solution is acceptable if 1 > Rm > 1/2 .
The assumption Rv = 1 is not realistic, therefore with an imperfect
voter the inequality 5.4 may be solved as follows;
2	 3	 Rm3R m -2R m >
Rv
2	 I3R m -2R m - rv > 0
This is a quadratic equation and can be rearranged as follows:
Rm
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2
2 3	 1	 3	 9	 I11,„-R in +	 < 0 or ( R m- T ) --16 + 2Rv <n‘'2Rv
,,,,
	 3 12 9R-8
i‘or t in'T i < 16R,
In order to have solution to the above inequality ( in terms of real
numbers ) the term ( 9 Rv - 8) / Rv must be either positive or zero. i.e.
89 -	 >. 0 , therefore R>= —8
 or R>= 0.89Rv	 v 9
For Rv = 0.89 , the minimum value for Rm is 0.75.
Thus the requirements for a TMR to be useful are:
1-With a perfect voter the minimum value of module reliability is 0.5
2- The minimum value for the reliability of a voter to be used in a
TMR structure is 0.89 , then with such a voter the minimum reliability
of a module to be used is 0.75.
Considering the reliability of the TMR system evaluated above and the
curves plotted in Fig. 5.1, one concludes that TMR technique is not
suitable for long missions, as the system reliability will be even less
than a non-redundant system if the mission time is long. An
important point in the TMR scheme is that particular attention should
be paid to the reliability of the voter.
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The important role of the voter in producing error-free computation is
obvious. Failure in the voter used in the system, amounts to
system failure.
The majority voter for a TMR is very simple and its logic diagram is
shown in Fig. 5.4
Z = X1 X2 + X 1 X3 +
 X2X3
Using De Morgan's Theorem we obtain:
Z =X / X2 . X 1 X3 . X2X3
rr	 .eciAL*.voter outD.
Fig. 5.4 Logic diagram of a TMR voter
Reliability of this voter can be obtained as a function of reliability of the
gates used in the circuit.
4R v = 1.,' NAND
For example, for a Bipolar TTL NAND gate estimated failure rate is
0.011 per million hours ( field failure rate is 0.015 per million hours ).
If we assume the probability function for this gate is exponential, then
5.5
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0
=
.01 . t )4
R v".-  exP ( - 1 NAND • t )4 exP (	
65
10
Reliability of the voter is normally more than that shown in the
equation 5.5 . For example, if one of the NAND gate's output is
stuck-at-0 the correct output still may be obtained. The reliability of
each gate depends on the technology used and also on the realisation
of the gate itself.
5.5 - Reliability of an NMR Structure
NMR is the general form of a TMR for any odd number N [MaSo751. If
n=(N-1)/2, then an NMR system can tolerate as many as n module
failures. The reliability of such a system is , therefore
n
r ‘-‘ N
R NMR = I. 2., C i (1-R m) i . R(inN-0].R,
N 
iwhere C i s combinatorial N object taken i at a time
Higher reliability is expected as the number of modules in an NMR
structure increases. But on the other hand the complexity of the voter
increases non-linearly with the number of modules. Thus there is an
optimum number of modules that results in maximum reliability
occurrence, using the NMR technique. Figures 5.5 and 5.6 show the
reliability of a TMR, a 5MR, and a 7MR system with perfect and
imperfect voters respectively.
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Fig. 5.5 shows the reliability of a TMR, a 5MR, and a 7MR system as a
function of time, and compare them with a non-redundant
system. The voter used in each system is assumed to be perfect.
Time period is from t=0 to t=20000 hours.
The failure rate of the basic module is A. = 6* l0
	
per hours
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TMR with imperfect voter Iv = 1 * 106 failure / hour
5MR with imperfect voter Av =4 * 10-6 failure / hour
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Fig. 5.6 shows the reliability of a TMR, a 5MR, and a 7MR system as a
function of time with imperfect voters, and compare them with
a non-redundant system.
Time period is from t=0 to t=20000 hours.
The failure rate of the basic module is A. = (3 * 10 	 per hours
Time ( thousands of hours )
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5.6 - Reliability of dynamic redundancy structure.
The dynamic redundancy technique has been described in chapter
three. In this type of design there is one active module and one or
more spares. The switching circuit will disconnect the active module
and replace it with a spare module if a failure is detected in the active
module. It is assumed that the modules are independent and the
reliability of each module is Rm. The system is working properly as
long as only one fault-free module remains. Thus the system reliability
can be expressed by equation 5.6.
R sys =[1-(1-R m ) s+1]Rs.Rd	 5.6
Rs is the switch reliability
Rd is the detector reliability and
R sys= 1 _ (1_ R m ) s+1	 with perfect switch and detection circuit
In the equation 5.6 the importance of a reliable switch and detection
circuit is obvious. Diagram 5.7 shows the reliability of a system with
one active module and two spares , and compares it with the reliability
of a non-redundant system. In this structure the switch and the
detection circuit become very complex when many spare units are used
, thus the reliability of the system decreases significantly, resulting in
an inefficient system.
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There are many practical systems using one active unit and one spare.
For example, the Bell Electronic Switching System ESS [To78 1.
Only the cost and application of systems can determine which
technique should be used, the TMR, the dynamic with 1 spare, or the
dynamic with more spares, if high reliability is not the only criteria.
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Fig. 5.7 illustrates the reliability of a dynamic system (as a function of
time) consisting of one active module and two spares with
a perfect switch and disagreement detection circuit. The
improvement over a non-redundant and a TMR system is
shown.
The failure rate of the basic module is = 6 * 10 -5 failures per hours
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5.7 - Reliability of hybrid designs
Hybrid structure consists of an NMR core, some spare modules, a
disagreement detection circuit, a switch, and a voter. The system
output of a hybrid structure with N modules in its core is correct if
( N - 1 ) / 2 modules operate properly, provided that the switch, the
failure detection circuit, and the voter are fault-free. So the reliability of
a hybrid structure with a TMR core and S spares can be expressed by
the following equation
RH ( 3 , S) = 1 - ( probability of all ( S + 3 ) modules failing +
probability of all but one module failing )
=1- ( (1 -R m) (s+3) + (S +3).Rm.(1-Rm)(s+2)
=1- (1-Rm)(S+2) ( 1-Rm+S.Rm+3Rm)
=1- (1-Rm)(S+2) ( 1+Rm(S+2))
In general the reliability of a Hybrid ( N,S ) system is
n+S N+S	 i (N+S -0
RH(N,S).= E Ci .(1-R m) .Rm
i=0
5.7
where: S = number of spares and
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N = number of modules in the core
n = ( N - 1 ) / 2 fault-tolerance of the core
3
R H(3,2) -= 24 Ci .( 1 -R m) .Rm
1.0
5	 1_4	 2„3	 3_
= R m + 5 (1 -R m)1( m + 10 (1 -R m)x m+10 ( )x 2m
The above equation expressed the system reliability with a perfect
Voter, Switch, and Disagreement detection circuit (VSD). If the
reliability of these circuits (i.e. Rv , Rs, and Rd ) were taken into
account, the system reliability would be
5	 4	 2_3	 3 2R (3,2) = [ Rm +5 (1 -R n.?R m + 10 (1 -Rd Kin +10(1-R m) Rin ] Rv Rs Rdsys
The important role of the VSD reliability in this scheme in
determining the overall system reliability [0g74] [0g75] should be
noted by the system designers.	 Mk
A reliable switch design for a hybrid ( 3, 2) system has been proposed
by Siewiarek [SiMc73]. An example of using this type of redundancy is
the Self Testing And Repairing computer STAR [AvEt71].
The reliabilities of hybrid ( 3, 1 ) and hybrid ( 3, 2) are shown in Fig. 5.8
The switching and the voting mechanisms are assumed to be fault-free.
The reliability of a non-redundant and a TMR system are also plotted
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on the same graph for comparison. Figure 5.9 illustrates the reliability
of systems with imperfect VSD circuits . Several values have been
chosen for Rv, Rs, Rd.
Generally Rv > Rd > Rs , because the switch is more complex than the
detection circuit , and the detection circuit is more complex than the
voter.
In practice the system reliability of hybrid is higher than the value
shown in equation 5.7 because the failure rate of the passive spare
modules ( p. ) is less than the failure rate of the active modules ( A. ), in
the core.
The reliability of a system using hybrid structure is greater than the
reliability of a system using TMR, or a system using its equivalent
NMR structure. But for long mission time, the reliability of all of these
redundant designs will be less than the reliability of a single module, as
is shown in the graphs. So the immediate result is that a system with
no redundancy is more reliable than a system with redundancy in wry
long missions. But there are other parameters to be considered, because
faults will occur during the operation of the system. The first one is the
fault tolerance, that is the number of faults that can be tolerated by a
system. If we have a non-redundant system, the fault tolerance of the
system is zero, i.e. after the occurrence of the first failure we get the
wrong output and if that system is used for an important task the
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consequence could be catastrophic . But if we use a fault-tolerant
system, one or more faults can be tolerated without affecting the final
output.
Another parameters is availability . There are cases that nonstop
operation of a system is required even with the presence of faults. This
requirement can not be achieved by a non-redundant system ( e.g.
telephone switching systems).
Systems used in Long-life applications (for instance in spacecraft where
systems require long periods of unattended operation ) must also
have fault-tolerant mechanisms.
Critical application is another example in which a system is designed
to undertake critical tasks therefore it must have the ability to tolerate
permanent and transient faults which is not possible using a
non-redundant system.
The above discussion shows that fault-tolerance is necessary in many
digital system designs even if highly reliable computation is not
required.
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Fig 5.8 shows the reliability of a hybrid system with a TMR core and 1
spare, and a hybrid system with a TMR core and two spares as a
function of time, ( t=0 to t=20000). Voter and reconfiguration
mechanism are assumed to be perfect.
The failure rate of the basic module is X = 6* 10 -5 failures per hours
Time ( thousands of hours )
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Fig. 5.9 shows the reliability of a hybrid system with a TMR core and 1
spare, and a hybrid system with a TMR core and two spares as a
function of time, ( t=0 to t=20000). Voter and reconfiguration
mechanism are not perfect (their reliabilities are shown in the
graph).
The failure rate of the basic module is X = 6 * 10 -5 failures per hours
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We have evaluated the reliability of the systems using the classical
model, and compared the overall system reliability of the most
common fault-tolerant configurations. Frequently the classical model
does not give accurate reliability calculations . The reason is often the
generality of the model. Therefore in the following sections, a model
that is appropriate for the reliability evaluation of the FIR-HE and the
MFT-RS schemes will be developed.
5.8 - Levels of Reliability Models
Typically, a reliability model divides a structure into various
subsections that are easier to study than the whole structure itself. The
technique to be applied depends upon the amount of detail given about
each subsection. The detail in each subsection is itself a function of the
desired accuracy of the model. We will now describe levels at which
systems may be modelled. It is to be noted that often the boundary
between the levels is not clear, and the distinction is often merely for
convenience or understandability.
The highest level of modelling is that of the system level, in which an
entire hardware system is treated as a black box. A large number of
observations are made about events ( e.g. , failures of a certain kind ) ,
and the time intervals between events ( i.e. time for recovery of the
system ) . A model may then be proposed to fit the data as closely as
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possible . An enormous amount of observations are needed for
successful modelling . The problem is especially hard to tackle if there
are many types of events.
The next level at which a model may be attempted is the module level
• The system is divided into a number of modules which have
mutually independent failure probability distributions. The model of
the system is obtained by a composition of the models of the modules.
If it is not possible to divide a system into independent modules, the
modules are so formed that they have nearly independent failure
distributions . An approximate model is arrived at by assuming the
modules to be independent . The modules themselves need to be
modelled individually if they are not identical . Classical hardware
reliability modelling has occurred at this level.
To obtain a model for a hardware module one may have to go to a
lower level . This is the gate level of modelling, and gate reliability is
often the basic parameter used to obtain the system reliability. Almost
always the gates are assumed to have independent probability
distributions in the absence of redundancy . Although this assumption
is sometimes not realistic, any diversion from it substantially
complicates the mathematics . An exponential distribution is
commonly assumed for the gate reliability . Under the assumption of
independence, if a gate reliability is	 p , and a module with
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non-redundant logic has m gates, the module reliability is Pm .
In most systems , one does not have to go below the gate level .
However, if the redundancy is introduced at a lower level , we need
the component level of modelling, where components are transistors,
diodes, resistors , etc . We will have occasion to use this level at a later
stage ( for example for the voters used in the fault-tolerant designs
which will be discussed in a later section).
There are several reasons why the module level of reliability
modelling should be studied . A first-order approximation of the
reliability of large hardware systems can be easily derived by assuming
module independence and counting components in each module. The
number of parameters are usually few and dominating parameters or
architectural features are identified. Further , various architectures can
be compared on a gross scale. For these reasons , in the next section the
emphasis is on the module level of reliability modelling.
5.9 - A new reliability model
In this section a new model is introduced to evaluate the reliability of
HR-HE structure. An N-channel HR-HE structure may produce correct
output as long as two out of N modules operating correctly. Therefore
the overall system reliability may be calculated by the following
118
equation:
R sr = [1 - (1 - R m ) N -N (1-Rm) (N-1) . R m ]. Rswitch.Rvoter
In addition to the assumption made for the classical model discussed
earlier , let us assume that the switch components in HR-HE are
independent. We define R. as the reliability of each switch component
as illustrated in Fig. 4.9. Let us also introduce two new parameters, a
and 13 which will be used to relate the reliability of the switch and the
voter, (with three inputs) respectively, to the module reliability Rm .
We will let R. = ( Rm )cx, and R, = ( Rm )C-0 where C is a factor which
reflects how complex the voter is compared to the three input voter
used by a three channel system. As it is assumed that the switch
components are independent, each switch component may be
included in the corresponding module , and the reliability of the
modified module (defined as the cascade of the module with its switch
component) can be computed. Then the overall system reliability may
be calculated by
N	 N - 1
a	 C . 13R= [1 - ( 1 -R mR am ) - N (1 -RmR am )	 .RmR m ] . Rm
sYs
Fig. 5.10-a shows the reliability of a three channel, a five channel, and
a seven channel Ha-HE structure with perfect switch , and voter, that
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is a = 0.0 , and f3 = 0.0 .
The overall system reliability of the same systems with imperfect
switches and voters are shown in Fig. 5.10-b and Fig.10-c .
To calculate the reliability in this case, it is assumed that a = 0.1 , and
13 = 0.02 . The value for a is chosen arbitrarily, because HR-HE may
be used for any module, and choosing a = 0.1 indicates that the
module complexity of the employed module is ten times greater than
the switch component complexity.
It should be noted that the switch and the voter realisations are known
if a particular fault-tolerant scheme is selected , that is the number of
gates or transistors used by the switch and the voter are known . Thus a
relation may be established between the complexity of the voter and
the switch component. For the above calculation a particular
realisation is used for the voter ( which will be discussed later ) . Now if
a = 0.1 we may obtain a value to assign it to 13 . For example if a three
channel HR-HE is used, 13 = 0.02 . For a five channel 13 = 0.03, and
for a seven channel 13 = 0.05.
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Fig. 5.10 - a System reliability of ( 3, 5, 7 channels ) HR-HE as a
function of time, with perfect voter , switch, and disagreement
detection circuit. Time period ( t=0 to t=20000 hours).
The failure rate of the basic module is X. =6 * 10 -5 failures per hours
Time ( thousands of hours )
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Fig. 5.10 - b System reliability of ( 3, 5, 7 channels ) HR-HE as a
function of time, with imperfect voter (b=0.02, 0.03, and 0.05
respectively), switch and disagreement detection circuit (a=0.1)
as shown in the graph.
Time period ( t=0 to t=20000 hours).
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N.B. In figures 5.10 to 5.17 variables 'a' and '13' are represented by 'a' and 'b'
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Fig. 5.10 - c System reliability of ( 3, 5, 7 channels ) HR-HE as a
function of time, with imperfect voter (b=0.02, 0.03, and 0.05
respectively), switch and disagreement detection circuit (a=0.1)
as shown in the graph.
Time period ( t=0 to t=50000 hours).
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5.10 - Comparing Schemes
There are a few measures for evaluation and comparison of different
schemes . System reliability, Rsys , is the most obvious measure . As
will be evident from the examples that will be presented, the graphs of
Rsys against the number of modules (N) effectively high light the
dependence of Rsys on (N). This is shown in Fig. 5.11.
However , for comparing systems that are highly reliable, R sys is not a
good measure of comparison.
Another absolute measure that may be used is the mission time . The
mission time Tm is defined to be the time at which Rsys is exactly
equal to some predetermined value ( Rsysmin ). It is , in other words, the
time after which Rsys drops below that required for the minimum
system reliability desired. Tm may be determined by using :
Rsys ( Tm
A more interesting measure , and one that will be used in the
examples that follow , is a comparative one , namely , the Mission
Time Improvement (MTI) . MTI is defined to be the ratio of the
mission times of the two schemes to be compared, which is a function
of the Rsysmin. It is a more useful measure because MTI may be
determined more easily. If for schemes 1 and 2 Rsys1 ( tl ) = R5ys2 ( t2) ,
) = Rsys min -
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then the MTI of scheme 1 over scheme 2 is ( t 1 / t2 ), where t1 and t2
are the mission times of systemi
 and system2 respectively. If the two
schemes have modules with identical failure rates X , with modules
reliability R1 = exp ( - X t1 ) and R2 = exp ( - X t2 ) , the MTI equals
( Ln Ri / Ln R2 ) .
MTI of HR-HE scheme over TMR:
The MTI of the HR-HE scheme over TMR was found in the following
manner. Assuming identical modules ( having the same failure rate
X), a value for R1 , the reliability of a module in the HR-HE was picked
arbitrarily. The equation RHR_HE ( R1 ) = RTNIR ( R2
 ) was solved for R2.
Since R1 = exp ( - A. t1 ) and R2 = exp ( - A. t2 ) , Ln R1 / Ln R2 yields
the desired MTI. When MTI > 1 , the HR-HE has longer Tm than TMR
scheme. Results of this computation are presented in Fig. 5.12.
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Fig. 5.11 The reliability of HR-HE as a function of the number of
modules for three different values of module reliability.
The failure rate of the basic module is X = 6 * 1O
	 per hours
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Fig. 5.12 shows the Mission Time Improvement (MTI) of a 5 and a 7
channel HR-HE structures over the TMR structure for different
values of a and 0.
The failure rate of the basic module is X. = 6 * 1O 	 per hours
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The MFT-RS scheme compared with The TMR structure:
The overall system reliability of the MFT-RS under the new model
with the same assumption for the switch and the voter as in the
HR-HE scheme, is given by
M	 (N-i)
Rs ys = 0 _, Ec r 0 _R m Rncic,	 . (R m R,:): )i ]) . R :113
i = 0
where M=(—N-1) -12
An analysis similar to that for the HR-HE was carried out for the
MFT-RS . Fig. 5.13 - 5.15 show the graphs of RI,AFT_Rs , arid the MCI of
the MFT-RS over TMR respectively.
Fig. 5.16 and 5.17 show comparisons between the HR-HE, the MFT-RS
schemes, and a hybrid(3,2) which is used an iterative switch array.
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Fig. 5.13 System reliability of ( 3, 5, 7 channels ) MFT-RS as a
function of time, with perfect voter, switch, and disagreement
detection circuit. Time period (t=0 to t=20000 hours).
The failure rate of the basic module is X =6 * 10 -5 failures per hours
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Fig. 5.14 System reliability of ( 3, 5, 7 channels ) MFT-RS as a
function of time, with imperfect voter (b=0.02, 0.03, and 0.05
respectively), switch and disagreement detection circuit (a=0.1)
as shown in the graph.
Time period ( t=0 to t=20000 hours).
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Fig. 5.15 shows the Mission Time Improvement (MTI) of a 5 and a 7
channel MFT-RS structures over the TMR structure for different
values of a and j3. The graphs show that TMR offers a better
mission time for reliabilities dose to 1.
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Fig. 5.16 shows the comparisons between the HR-HE, MFT-RS
structures, and a hybrid(3,2) (all with perfect switching
mechanisms).
The failure rate of the basic module is X = 6 * 1O 	 per hours
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Fig. 5.17 shows the comparisons between the HR-HE, MFT-RS
structures, and a hybrid(3,2) with imperfect switching
mechanisms and different values for a and 13.
The failure rate of the basic module is = 6 * 10-5 failures per hours
Time ( thousands of hours )
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5.11 - Critical Components in Fault-Tolerant Structures
Any fault-tolerant system will be totally dependent upon the correct
functioning of some critical elements which are usually referred to as
the hardcore of the system. In particular, it is vital that the measures
and mechanisms provided for fault tolerance are themselves reliable,
otherwise little confidence can be placed in the ability of the system to
handle failures. For instance, the voter in any of the fault-tolerant
designs is regarded as hardcore. In view of its critical role in the system,
the hardcore must be designed to operate very reliably indeed. This can
only be achieved by adapting fault prevention techniques to minimise
the number of faults in the hardcore, or by incorporating further
fault-tolerance for the voter itself (as discussed in section 5.4 Fig. 5.3).
There are two obvious difficulties . Firstly, at some level the system
must be built from components which are not fault tolerant. Secondly,
why should it be possible to achieve high reliability for the hardcore of
a system any more easily than for the system itself? The solution to
these difficulties is simple.
Indeed, simplicity is the key. The hardcore of a well-designed system
must be simple; at least it must be much less complex than the rest of
the system which depends on it.
In the next section therefore a method of implementing the critical
element of the fault-tolerant designs ( in our case the voters ) will be
presented. Two types of voters are generally used ,namely threshold
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voters and majority voters. It seems that the majority voters can be
realised with less complexity than the threshold voters, particularly
when the number of inputs increases. The proposed implementation is
for majority voters.
5.12 - Implementation of the majority gates in fault-tolerant designs
One method of implementing the majority gates is , by using the basic
gates such as AND/ OR, or NAND gates. Of course using only one type
of these gates for the required function of the voters is often very
helpful, since a more regular structure can be obtained. But even by
taking this approach, too many transistors will be used compared with
the following proposed approach, particularly when the number of
inputs to the voter are more than three. An improvement in
reliability would be expected from a reduction in the number of
transistors and the silicon area utilised for the circuits.
In order to conserve physical space on the chip it is most important to
employ regular structure in designing circuits and in particular
majority voters. Implementing the voters using basic gates , e.g. NAND
gates, (in its equivalent MOS transistor circuit form) would be
unstructured and hence inefficient in terms of silicon area utilisation
and the number of interconnections required. What is required is a
cellular or modular structure which can be used by itself as a voter or
be repeated (cascaded) to achieve the required function of the voting.
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5.13 - Modular approach for the voter implementation
The developments in integrated circuit technology , particularly the
use of MOS transfer gates ( also called a pass transistor ) has made an
old technique called iterative network [Mu86], attractive again.
Application of the pass transistor and the use of the above technique is
the basis for implementation of highly reliable voters.
The n-MOS pass transistor acts as a switch when there is a positive
voltage on its gate . The switch is closed or 'ON' if the drain and source
are connected. This can be achieved by applying a voltage to the gate
(gate HIGH). The switch is open or 'OFF' if the drain and source are
disconnected which can be achieved by zero voltage to the gate ( gate
LOW) . The schematic representation is shown in Fig. 5.16
_TO
a 0--I I--o b a 0---eolgro—mo b
open switch
a 0---I 1-----0 b a 0.--•—wo--c• b
closed switch
Fig. 5.16 shows a MOS transistor as a switch.
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There is however a disadvantage of using pass transistors and that is
the delay encountered when they are connected in series . In this case a
degradation of the signal level will occur which should be reinstated by
the use of invertor amplifier . If n pass transistors are used in series,
the delay is proportional to n2
 , and for n-MOS transistors the
maximum number of transistors in series is about four , but using
CMOS technology will increase this number. However the delay that
occurs for small circuits such as the voters in fault-tolerant schemes is
less than the delay that occurs when basic gates are used.
There is another point about the function of the voters which helps to
simplify their implementation. It should be noted that the majority
function is a symmetric function. A symmetric function is a logic
function which has the property of remaining unchanged when any
two of its variables ( called the variables of symmetry ) are
interchanged. For example , the following function is symmetric,
since
Z = Xi. X2 + X1 X3 + X2 X3
if the variables Xi. and X2 are interchanged ( i.e. replace all Xi's with
X2 's and vice versa ) we obtain
Z = X2 X1 + X2 X3 + X1 X3
which is identical to the original function.
Symmetric functions can be represented by a basic contact (path closing)
network, which has one input and which branches out to give m+1
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outputs, where m is the number of variables . Symmetric circuits are
of considerable importance in LSI/VLSI design , since the contact
network may be mapped directly into NMOS circuitry.
The circuit is such that a logic 1 ( HIGH ) signal will propagate through
the network from the pull-up transistor to an output, with the
particular path being defined by the states of the input variables ( a high
signal effectively closes the path ) ; logic 0 signals will propagate from
ground to all other outputs . Additional pass transistors are needed to
obtain the required function. Fig 5.17 illustrates the implementation
...,.
of a three inputs majority gate . The circuit operates as follows:
if all the input variables ( X1 , X2, X) are HIGH then the transistors on
columns 2, 4, and 6 are ON and pass the high voltage (applied to the
depletion mode pull-up transistor) to the top-most output line in the
diagram. So, any time that there is a high voltage on this line , all of
the three input variables are HIGH ( logic value 1) . Similarly, if there
is a HIGH voltage on any of the other output lines, the number under
the output line represents the number of HIGH input variables. Now
the output of the voter is assumed to be 0 unless a HIGH voltage is on
the output line 3, or 2, which indicates that the voter output should be
logic 1.
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input variables
Fig. 5.17 The implementation of a 3 input majority voter using n-MOS
transistors
It is possible to optimise the number of transistors in this design. As we
are not interested in the value of outputs 1, and 0, the transistors
Passing the voltage to these lines are not needed and may be omitted.
This is shown with the dotted box in the schematic diagram of the
above design in Fig. 5.18.
139
cell 1
n
o
1
o
cell 3	 output
cell 2	 lines
0 	 o. 3
MillinailMil•WalCIIMSIMZEIMilirill
-
Xi Xi	X2X2	 R3 X3
input variables
Fig. 5.18 The schematic diagram a 3 input majority voter
(modular approch)
In the above diagram each sloping or horizontal line within each cell
represents one pass transistor, with the exception of the bottom-most
horizontal line which is a connection to the ground. The number of
transistors before the optimisation are shown on the bottom-left corner
of each cell , and after the optimisation , on the bottom right corner.
Fig. 5.19 and Fig 5.20 show a five inputs , and a seven inputs majority
gate respectively.
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Fig. 5.19 The schematic diagram for a five input majority gate
The reliability of each voter also can be calculated in terms of the
reliability of each transistor. If the reliability of each transistor is
denoted by Rtr , , the reliability of the voter may be expressed by the
following equation
R, = ( Rtr ) n where n is the number of transistors used in the voter.
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Fig. 5.20 The schematic diagram of a seven input majority voter
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The following table shows a comparison of the number of transistors
used for each voter using the above approaches.
Majority voter
no. of transistors
3 Inputs
gate
5 Inputs
gate
7 Inputs
gate
Implemented by
NAND/NOR 16 86 374
Implemented by
NMOS
pass transistors *
25 51 85
Implemented by
NMOS
pass transistors **
19 39 65
* Transistors' number
befor optimization
* * Transistors' number
after optimization
Table shows the number of transistors used for the implementation of
3, 5, and 7 inputs majority gates by different approaches.
5.14 - Summary
In this chapter the overall reliability of a few fault-tolerant designs
(induding our new designs) has been analysed to show when and how
much reliability improvement can be achieved by the different
techniques. To do these analyses, the dassical reliability model was first
discussed and used. The case of the TMR structure was discussed in
detail because TMR is often used as a threshold to compare different
redundancy techniques. Secondly a new reliability model was
developed . It was shown that because of the structure of the switches
143
in the MFT-RS and the HR-HE schemes, each module and its related
switch component can be modelled as a pair. Therefore the new
reliability model can be used for these schemes. The results of these
analyses were plotted and it was shown that the new fault-tolerant
techniques have a few advantages over the other well known
techniques.
Finally in this chapter a new approach was proposed to reducing the
size and the complexity of voters in fault-tolerant designs. Since
voters are the most critical components in fault-tolerant systems,
decreasing their complexity has a benficial effect on overall system
reliability as well as other factors such as area overhead and power
consumption. It was shown that a great reduction in the number of
transistors can be achieved by the application of n-MOS pass transistors
within a modular structure for a voter (particularly when the number
of inputs to the voter is greater than three).
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CHAPTER SIX
APPLICATION OF EXPERT SYSTEMS 
IN FAULT-TOLERANT DESIGNS 
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6.1 - Expert systems
6.11 - Introduction
In this chapter, expert systems will be discussed from the point of view
of an appliCation to a fault-tolerant design choice assistant and
prediction of reliability of digital systems. Expert systems are used in an
attempt to minimise or eliminate the needs for highly specialised
experts in this field. Experts are people who are very good at specific
types of problems. Their skill usually comes from extensive experience,
and detailed specialised knowledge of the problems they handle, for
example engineering experts who carry out diagnosis and repair of
high technology equipment, such as computers.
Whenever human experts posses complex knowledge about a highly
specific subject area and are in great demand and short supply, a
computer-based consultant can help, amplify, and disseminate the
needed expertise. A computer-based expert system seeks to capture
enough of the human specialist's knowledge so that it too will solve
problems expertly, freeing the human experts to concentrate on areas
that are more useful.
One popular application area for expert systems is microelectronics. In
sophisticated VLSI circuit design, such as fault-tolerant designs, there is
likewise a shortage of trained experts, and as technology becomes more
complex, this problem will get progressively worse. There is also a
shortage of expert reliability engineers to evaluate and predict the
reliability of these complex circuits under different conditions, at
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different times, and with a wide range of variables.
Expert systems that perform prediction infer the likely consequences of
given situations. Prediction systems sometimes use simulation
models, programs that mirror real-world activity, to generate situations
or scenarios that could occur from particular input data. These
potential situations, together with knowledge about the processes that
originated them, form the basis for the predictions. It should be pointed
out that relatively few prediction systems have been developed to date,
possibly because of the difficulty in creating and interfacing with
simulation models. Prediction of system reliability is one area which
require more attention. Therefore a computer-based system is needed
and can be developed to predict digital systems reliability.
The new tool ( expert systems in this field ) has its greatest value in that
it predicts the overall reliability of systems under different conditions
at any required time.
6.1.2 - Why build an expert system?
We have mentioned the most obvious reasons: dissemination of rare
and costly expertise, and the more effective and efficient use of the
human expert.
Other reasons for building expert systems are:
- the possibility of combining the expertise from many human experts
into a shared knowledge-base that can be then studied for consistency
and reliability of its advice.
- the permanence of these systems. Human expertise can quickly fade,
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regardless of whether it involves mental or physical activity. An expert
must constantly practice and rehearse to maintain proficiency in some
problem area. Any significant period of disuse can seriously affect the
expert's performance.
- the ease with which an expert system can be transferred or
reproduced. Transferring knowledge from one human to another is
the laborious, lengthy, and expensive process called education or
training. Transferring artificial expertise is the trivial process of copying
or cloning a program or data file.
Thus expert systems are suitable for tasks that require experience in
order to perform them proficiently. Gaining experience is a time
consuming, and often a very expensive process.
Thus unlike a human expert whose time is restricted, an expert system
is available for use 24 hours a day, every day of the year. Human
experts are limited in number, while many expert systems can be
created. In addition the computerised expert system never dies - taking
the knowledge with it -, the knowledge in an expert system can be
easily copied and stored, thus loss of knowledge is actually quite rare.
Finally expert systems are always at peak performance, and often
compute the best possible opinions ( within the limitation of their
knowledge ), while a human expert gets tired, affecting the reliability of
his advice in some cases. For the above reasons an expert system will
be implemented. In this chapter we describe how an expert system
may be designed and used as a fault-tolerant design adviser.
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6.2 - Development of an expert system
Generally there are three groups involved in the development of an
expert system
I ) Experts
This group provides the specialised knowledge for the expert
system.
II) Knowledge engineers
This group questions the experts, structures the knowledge
and uses it to implement the knowledge base.
III) Users
They state their requirements and ideas, and above all, define
the scenario in which the expert system will be used.
In the development phase, the main emphasis is on the work of the
knowledge engineer and the expert [Wa86]. Their relationship is
shown in Fig 6.1.
Fig. 6.1 The relationships in the Development of an Expert System.
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6.3 - How expert systems operate
Expert systems are computer programmes that can mimic the
behaviour of a human expert. An expert system will use information
supplied by the user to give an opinion on a certain subject, or it will
ask questions until it can identify an object that matches the answers.
Every expert system has two major parts : the knowledge base and the
inference engine [HaWaLe831 [Weal].
6.3.1 - The knowledge Base
The knowledge base is a database that holds specific information and
rules about a certain subject. There are two basic terms that will be used
frequently in our discussion:
OBJECT: The conclusion that is defined by its associated rules
ATTRIBUTE: A specific quality that, with its rule, helps define the
object.
Therefore, our knowledge base contains a list of objects with their
associated rules and attributes. In the simple sense ( and for many
applications ), the rule that is applied to an attribute states that the
object either "has" or "has not" the attribute. Thus, an object can be
defined by using a list of attributes that the object either does or does
not possess. For example, an expert system that may advise on various
types of redundancy techniques might have a knowledge base like this:
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OBTECT	 RULE ATTRMUTE 
TMR	 has	 3 basic modules
TMR	 has	 a 3 input voter
TMR	 has no switching circuit
The knowledge base can be simplified more by using only one rule
(e.g. "has" ), and a negative form of the attribute will be used if a "has
no" relationship should be established. Thus, the rule simply becomes
"possesses," and the simplified knowledge base looks like this:
OBTECT	 POSSESS 
TMR	 has 3 basic modules
TMR	 has a 3 inputs voter
TMR	 has no switching circuit
Although sophisticated expert systems may need more complex rules
than simply "possesses," this rule is sufficient for our situations and
greatly simplifies the knowledge base. Our system is implemented such
that the knowledge base consists of only objects and their attributes.
6.3.2. - The inference Engine
The inference engine is the part of the expert system that attempts to
use the information that the user supplies to find an object that
matches. There are two broad categories of inference engines:
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deterministic and probabilistic [Nan
In the deterministic category, the user will get his answer with
certainty, (as for example, the number of electrons in an atom which
express the identity of that atom). However in the probabilistic category
the answer has a degree of uncertainty. That is the answer is likely, but
uncertain, as for instance, the position of the electron around an atom,
when its velocity is already calculated (uncertainty principle). Most
disciplines are not deterministic, but rather are probabilistic to a certain
extent. However, for many of these, the uncertainty factor is not
statistically important so they can be treated as deterministic situations.
In our case we deal only with a deterministic expert system because its
implementation is easier. Beyond the two broad categories of certainty
and uncertainty, there are three basic ways to construct the inference
engine: forward chaining, backward chaining, and rule value [Ne87].
The differences of these methods relate to the way that the engine
attempts to reach its goal.
6.3.3. - The Forward-Chaining Method
Forward-chaining is sometimes called data-driven because the
inference engine uses information that the user provides to move
through a network of logical A NDs and ORs until it reaches a terminal
point, which is the object. If the inference engine cannot find an object
by using the existing information, then it requests more. The attributes
that define the object create the path that leads to the object (the only
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way to reach the object is to satisfy all of its rules) . Thus, a
forward-chaining inference engine starts with some information and
then tries to find an object that fits the information.
Fig. 6.2 shows the structure of the forward chaining. A
forward-chaining system essentially builds a tree from the leaves down
to the root.
Initial Knowledge/Facts
Rules	 The Selected path
	
1
•
	
	
•
	
Forward Chaining
Goal
Fig. 6.2 Forward-chaining, shows a path through the decision tree
( from the attributes to the object).
6.3.4. - The Backward-Chaining Method
Backward-chaining is the reverse of forward-chaining. A backward
chaining inference engine starts with a hypothesis (an object) and
requests information to confirm or deny it. Backward-chaining is
sometimes called object-driven because the expert system begins with
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an object and attempts to verify it. To show how the backward-chaining
works, imagine that our computer suddenly stops working. The first
hypothesis for instance is that it has lost power. To check this, we listen
for the fan. Hearing the fan run, this hypothesis will be rejected and
we will proceed to another. The second hypothesis is that our
computer has crashed because of faulty software. To confirm or reject
this possibility, the computer will be rebooted and it will work, so the
second hypothesis holds true, and the answer will be obtained.
Fig. 6.3 illustrates the backward chaining method . As the diagram
shows, backward-chaining prunes a tree. This is the process opposite to
that of forward-chaining, which construct a tree.
Initial Knowledge/Facts
Rules	 The Selected path
	
1
•
	
	 •
	
Backward Chaining
Goal
Fig. 6.3 backward-chaining, shows a path through the decision tree
( from hypothesis object to the attributes ).
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6.3.5. - The Rule- Value Method
A rule-value inference engine is theoretically superior to either a
forward-chaining or backward-chaining system because it requests
information that has the greatest importance according to the current
state of the system. A rule-value inference engine is actually an
improved backward-chaining engine. The general operating theory is
that the system requests as its next piece of information the one that
will remove the most uncertainty from the system. In this approach,
the key point is the selection of those questions that make the most
rapid progress to a conclusion. The trouble with rule-value systems is
that they are difficult to implement. There are two reasons for this:
First : in real-life situations, the knowledge base is often so large that
the number of possible combinations exceeds what a system can easily
hold. Hence, the system cannot know what information removes the
most uncertainty for any given state. Second : rule-value systems
require the knowledge base to contain not only the standard
object-attribute information, but also a value quantifier, which makes
constructing the knowledge base more difficult. However, there are
certain situations that lend themselves to rule-value inferences more
than others. Also, when implemented, rule-value systems generally do
a better job than the other two methods. Note that some rule-value
expert systems began as either forward chaining or backward-chaining
systems that had a statistical module to record various aspects of the
system. Later, after an expert system of that type has been used awhile,
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this statistical information can be used to implement a rule-value
approach.
6.4 - Choosing a Method
At this point, the question is, which of the three types of inference
engines is the best to be used? The answer is, all three types can do the
job. But as stated earlier, a rule-value system is more difficult to be
implemented, so as we like to built a simple expert system, at this
stage, we should probably avoid this method. The forward-chaining
method makes the process of deriving the greatest amount of
information from the knowledge base somewhat easier because it
constructs a tree. A typical forward-chaining system finds all possible
objects that match the attributes. The advantage of the
backward-chaining method is that it requests only enough information
to find an object. Thus, because backward-chaining systems are
goal-driven, they allow only relevant information to be input into the
system. A backward chaining system is good when we want only one
object- even if other objects also satisfy the attributes. It is possible to
create a backward-chaining expert system that finds multiple solutions,
but it does require more work than constructing a forward-chaining
expert system. In the final analysis, any of the above approaches may be
used. However in this chapter, the backward-chaining method will be
used and an expert system will be implemented which can be
developed later by using rule-valued method.
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6.5 - Creating the Expert System
Now that we have the necessary background on expert systems, an
expert system that uses backward-chaining will be created in this
section. The implementation includes the necessary routines to create
the knowledge-base. The structure of our expert system is such that the
knowledge-base is separated from the inference engine (this helps us
avoiding some serious troubles which may occur by mixing them) .
To create the inference engine it is assumed that the knowledge base
consists only of objects and their attributes. The following specifications
also have been considered in the creation of an efficient inference
engine:
- The expert system must not inquire about the same attribute twice.
- The expert system should reject immediately and move past any
object that does not have one or more of the known necessary
attributes or that has an attribute that has already rejected.
- Upon command, the expert system should be able to report why it is
following a line of reasoning.
The third constraint not only is a way of verifying that the expert
system is operating correctly, but also is a method of educating the
user.
6.6 The structure of the expert system
In this section the expert system will be described in the form of
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structure charts.
6.6.1 The main body
At the highest level the system consists of five main subfunctions:
- the Enter ( ) subfunction
- the Load ( ) subfunction
- the Query ( ) subfunction
- the Save ( ) subfunction
- the eXit ( ) subfunction
which can be selected by the letter capitalised in each function. The
operation of the functions will be defined later. The structure chart is
shown in Fig. 6.4 which shows the hierarchy of the functions within
this level.
Query
Fig. 6.4 Illustrates the structure of the main
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6.6.2 Entering the Knowledge into the Knowledge Base
The enter procedure provides a set of facilities which allow the expert
to add expertise into the knowledge-base. This information should be
in the form of objects' names and their attributes. Fig. 6.5 illustrates the
chart for this procedure. The procedure starts by pressing letter E for
enter. Then the system will ask the expert to enter the name of the
object to be included in the object list of the knowledge base. Then it
would ask for the attributes of that object. These attributes will be
induded to the attribute list. By pressing the return key at the question
for the next attribute, ( if there is no more attribute for the object ), the
system will ask for another object. If the return key is pressed again,
(when no more object is required to be included), the procedure will be
ended and the function returns to the main menu. At this stage the
entries to the knowledge base should be saved. Thus function save
will be called, which saves this information in a data file called
expert .dat .
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Fig. 6.5 Shows how the Knowledge Base acquires information
160
6.6.3 Using the Inference Engine
The other part of the structure is the inference engine. The Query
procedure describes the operation of our inference engine. Chart 6.6
illustrates how the engine queries about an object and its attributes.
This function will not begins the query unless the knowledge base is
already loaded into the system. The Load function provides this
facilities when it is called by the main, by pressing letter L. When the
knowledge is loaded into the system, the Query procedure functions by
pressing letter Q at the main.
As shown in Fig. 6.6 , the engine selects the first object at the top of the
object list in the knowledge base, and checks for its attributes. If all the
answers to the questions are true , then the system prints out that
object as the conclusion of the query. If any of the answers is false, then
the next object in the list will be selected. This procedure will be
continued until the object which matches best with the answers can be
selected. In the case that the system can not conclude the correct
answer, the appropriate message will be printed.
Examples of entering knowledge into the system and loading and query
about an object are given in Appendix B.
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Fig. 6.6 Illustrates the process of query about an object
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6.7 - Summary
In this chapter we have discussed the development of an expert system
to be used as an advisor in fault-tolerant techniques. Generally three
groups should be involved in the development of an expert system
(experts, knowledge engineers, and users), but in the development
phase the main emphasis is on the work of the knowledge engineer
and the expert.
An expert system has two major parts: the knowledge-base and the
inference engine. The knowledge-base holds specific information and
rules about a certain subject (fault-tolerance techniques) in terms of
objects and their attributes.
The inference engine attempts to use the information that the user
supplies and the knowledge in the knowledge-base to find the answer
to the query.
Three general methods for the implementation of inference engine
were discussed (the forward chaining, the backward chaining, and the
rule-value method) and their differences were shown. The system
developed in this research has used the backward chaining method.
After gathering enough information the system can be developed and a
rule-value method may be used.
The result of the system run is shown in appendix B as an example.
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CHAPTER SEVEN
CONCLUSION AND FURTHER WORK
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Conclusions
7.1 -
Rapid advances in integrated circuit (IC) technology have enabled the
fabrication of digital circuits with a very large number of devices on a
single chip. With the help of CAD/CAE techniques, design and
fabrication of ICs have advanced to the point that functioning ICs of
considerable complexity can be produced in one relatively quick
iteration (IEEE). Unfortunately, some circuits on a finished wafer will
not work properly, while others will suffer packaging flaws.
On the other hand there is an ever increasing demand for highly
reliable computation, highly available systems, and long-life
applications. These requirements can be achieved through two general
approaches, Fault-prevention and fault-tolerance.
Fault prevention techniques are employed prior to the construction of
a system. There is an upper limit to reliability improvement that can be
achieved using these techniques due to technology and cost
limitations. Any attempt to improve this limit is either very costly or
produces poor results.
Fault-tolerance is the other approach to reliability improvement; it can
be used to easily pass the reliability upper limit achieved by the
fault-prevention techniques. Therefore reliability may be improved
even further by applying fault-tolerance methodology. So design and
implementation of fault-tolerant systems are of great importance.
Faults are expected to occur during system operation (due to designs'
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faults and system deterioration). Therefore the challenge is to couple
the potential of new technology with fault-tolerant techniques to
produce better systems to deal with these failures.
7.2 - Fault-prevention and testing difficulties
In spite of the great effort that has been devoted to developing testing
techniques, a number of serious problems exist. For example;
Generating Test Pattern, reducing CPU run time, overcoming CPU
memory-size limitations, improving Test Coverage . In the Test
Application side the difficulties are; immense test data volumes, High
Capital/Operating costs of testers, Long tester time required to apply the
test, and Diagnostic resolution.
The list of difficulties would be even longer for sequential circuit,
redundant circuit, and hazard detection as most test techniques are for
combinational circuits.
7.2.1 - Test Pattern Generation
As the use of Automated Test Equipment (ATE) has grown, so has the
demand for engineers and programmers to develop the programmes
that control these testers. Despite considerable efforts at developing
rigorous, systematic approaches to writing test programs for ATE, the
test engineer does not currently enjoy computer assistance that
approaches the level of the designer's CAD tools.With limited internal
access to increasingly complex circuits, the test generation problem is a
most untenable one. More efforts in the area of testing resulted in a
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new VLSI design methodology called Design For Testability (DFT). The
use of testability measures as a design criterion is one particularly
successful solution to this "testing problem".Taking this approach the
designer.
 tries to increase the controllability and observability of the
logic on the chip, but there is a limitation on the number of pins on
large chips.
In addition, there are new and complex failures being observed with
very large scale integration (VLSI) circuits. These problems are already
causing difficulties with the testing of the existing complex chips, and
testing is expected to be even more difficult with the higher-complexity
chips that are being proposed. When one considers that a complete
system consists of many boards, each consisting of many chips, the
magnitude of the task is overwhelming.
7.2.2 - Cost of testing
As digital systems become more complex, it is feared that the cost of
testing will become a major part of the cost of the system.
7.2.3 - Testing VLSI chips (exhaustive testing)
Testing all embedded elements (exhaustive testing ) in a large chip is
not practical. As an example exhausting testing of the Motorola 68000
microprocessor would take many years of CPU time.
Test program development is a very difficult task, exhaustive testing of
VLSI circuits is not practical, and the use of ATE is very costly.
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7.3 - Reliability and Fault-Tolerant computing
Reliability techniques have become of increasing interest for general
applications of computers because of several recent trends. A few of
these trends are listed below.
Harsher environments : Computer systems have left the clean
environments of computer rooms for industrial environments.
Temperature and humidity vary widely. The primary power supply
may fluctuate, and there may be more electromagnetic interference.
Novice users :The typical user is not sophisticated about the operation
of the system.
Increasing repair costs : As hardware costs continue to decline and
labour costs escalate, frequent field service calls become much more
expensive than adding redundancy to improve system reliability.
Large systems : As systems become larger, there are more components
that can fail. Since the overall failure rate is directly related to the
failure rates of the individual components, fault-tolerant designs may
be required to keep the over-all system failure rate at an acceptable
level.
From the point of view of reliability, computing systems can be
grouped into four different applications. The applications are ordered
by increasingly stringent reliability requirement.
General-Purpose commercial systems which are very susceptible to
transient errors ( due to close timing margins ) and permanent faults
(due to their complexity ). As performance demands increase, fault
tolerance may be the only recourse to building commercial systems
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with sufficient mean time to errors (MTTE) to allow useful
computation. Occasional errors that disrupt processing for several
seconds are tolerable as long as automatic recovery follows. Example of
these systems are VAX 11/780, IBM S/360 - S/370 - 4300, and Univac
1100/60.
High availability Systems share resources among many users and the
occasional loss of one user is acceptable. In these systems corporation of
redundancy techniques to improve their reliability has been very
successful. Tandem, Pluribus, ESS, and Intel 432 are examples of this
group.
Long - life systems such as unmanned spacecraft can not be manually
maintained over the system operating life (frequently 5 or more years).
These systems are highly redundant, with enough spares to survive
the mission with the required computational power as the peak
computational requirement is often at the end of system life. Voyager
and STAR computers are examples of long-life systems.
The last application group which places the highest demand on system
reliability is called Critical Applications Systems . The most stringent
requirement for fault-tolerance is in real-time control systems, where
faulty computations can jeopardise human life or have high economic
impact. In these cases, computation must not only be correct, but
recovery time from faults must be minimised. SIFT and FTMP are
examples of avionic computers designed to control dynamically
unstable aircraft. Their design goal is a failure probability of less than
10-9 for a 10 hour mission.
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By now it is apparent that the present requirements for highly reliable
computation, highly available systems, and long life applications make
design and implementation of fault-tolerant systems at great
importance. These requirements can not be achieved through the fault
prevention techniques alone as discussed in this dissertation.
This dissertation has provided three new hardware fault-tolerant
techniques. In each of these schemes a majority voter is used to vote on
the outputs of the replicated modules. Five channel implementations
of these techniques were compared and their behaviours in the
presence of multiple failures were examined.
In the first technique when a single module fails, its output to the
voter becomes stuck-at-0 and the output of the next module becomes
stuck-at-1. When another failure occurs, the system reconfigures itself
and the switch forces the output of one of the faulty modules to be s-a-O
and the other to be s-a-1.
In the case of three module failures (if they happen sequentially), the
first faulty module becomes s-a-O, and the other two faulty modules
become s-a-1, thus the voter computes the correct output to the outside
world. Fewer gates were used for the implementation of the switch in
this design than in the designs proposed by others for example
[SuDuCa80], [SiMc73], and [SoMa78]. Therefore the switch reliability is
better than the other switches used in the above mentioned schemes.
The switch and the disagreement detection circuits in the second
design developed in this work ( Multiple Fault Tolerant
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Reconfiguration Structure MFT-RS) were implemented with fewer
gates than any other similar designs proposed by others. In this scheme
when a single failure occurs, only the output of the faulty module
becomes s-a-O and the other modules' outputs remain unchanged. But
in the cases of double and treble faults the system reconfigures as in the
first design. One important feature of this design is the structure of the
switch component which enables us to model each module and its
related switch component as a pair, which is very helpful in reliability
evaluation of the system.
During this research a powerful fault-tolerant technique called Highly
Reliable-Highly Efficient (HR-HE) was developed and it was shown
that this design is more reliable than any other similar fault-tolerant
technique.
This design has the same "pair modelling" feature mentioned in the
MFT-RS, and can tolerate up to N-2 module failures ( where N is the
number of modules). In the event of failures, the switch forces the
logical outputs of the odd faulty modules in the structure to 1, and the
even faulty modules to 0.
In practice this means that every pair of faulty modules cancel each
other in the voting mechanism until two fault-free modules remain.
It was shown that the HR-HE structure has a few advantages over the
other designs. A five channel HR-HE has advantages over 5MR,
hybrid(3,2) [SiMc73], 5MR Reconfiguration Scheme [SuDuCa80], and a 5
channel Sift-out Redundancy Structure [SoMa78] from the point of
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view of both the simplicity of their switching structures and the
number of faults that can be tolerated (particularly for N>5).
The HR-HE is a very good candidate in "Critical applications",
"long-life applications", and "High availability applications".
The structures of the three techniques developed in this work are such
that the complexity of their switching mechanisms grow linearly with
the number of modules but the voting mechanism complexity
increases significantly. This is a better approach than those schemes
(e.g. hybrid with iterative switch [SiMc73] ) in which the switching
complexity increases significantly and the voter's complexity remains -
constant or grows linearly with the number of modules because it is
easier to implement a complex voter than a complex switch (voters
have more regular structures).
As the voters in fault-tolerant designs are the most critical
components, a regular and simple structure was presented in chapter
five and it was shown that a significant reduction in the number of
transistors can be achieved compared with other designs.
VLSI technology has many promising applications including the
design of super computers that use wafer-scale integration technology.
This factor possess the potential of major innovations in computer
architecture.
The designs proposed in this work are suitable for WSI architectures, in
which a whole system with high fault-tolerance and high reliability is
required.
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7.4 - Application of Fault-Tolerant techniques in Testing
The detection and location of faults play a significant role in the
implementation of fault-tolerant systems. Even in those computer
systems that are not labelled as fault tolerant, software or self-test
capability is provided to do fault-detection and, perhaps, fault location.
System diagnosis is a very important component of the maintenance
strategy for conventional (i.e. non fault-tolerant) systems. The
maintenance function is a very costly one because it is frequently
performed away from a centralised, cost-effective facility and is
personnel intensive. Thus design for fault-tolerance, including use of
testability features and effective system diagnosis tools, is vital to cost
containment. In addition, customer satisfaction is frequently tied to
minimising the downtime of the system, which in turn requires rapid
fault detection and location.
In fault-tolerant systems, diagnosis is an important tool. Regardless of
the fault-tolerance principles that serve as a basis for the system design,
it is important to detect and ultimately identify faulty units and take
the necessary actions to restore the system to a fault-free condition.
Because of the critical computational environments of many such
systems, diagnosis is frequently implemented in hardware in order to
minimise the time required for corrective action. The disagreement
detection circuits used in the proposed designs can play an important
role here. The outputs of the detection circuit shows if there is any
disagreement between the modules' outputs and the overall system
output. A monitoring system therefore can be used to warn the user
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when any fault is detected and informs the user that the system is in
degradation mode. Then the faulty module will be replaced
automatically or manually if it is possible.
These fault-tolerant techniques can also be used for testing modules to
detect if they are faulty or not. Suppose that we have a seven channel
BR-HE system. Then if the test vectors are applied to this system the
disagreement detection circuit detects if there is any mismatch between
the modules. Then the monitoring circuit at the outputs of this
detection circuit could report which modules do not match with the
system output. That is the faulty module can be detected and located
and if necessary can be replaced.
7.5 - Reliability Modelling
In this dissertation a new reliability model was developed to study the
case when each module and its related switch component can be
modelled as a pair for reliability evaluation.
Extensive comparisons were made between the different fault-tolerant
techniques (including the new techniques). The result of these
analyses were plotted, and the advantages of the new techniques were
demonstrated.
The reliability comparisons provide knowledge as to the circumstances
under which a given redundancy technique should be used. The final
chapter of the dissertation describes how this knowledge can be
incorporated in an expert system to form a fault-tolerant advisor as part
of a CAD system.
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7.6 - Future research
As the scale of integration of circuits continues to increase through
advances in semiconductor technology, it seems inevitable that future
hardware systems will become ever more complex, and therefore
increasingly liable to design faults. The current hardware design testing
and techniques seems to be inadequate to handle this problem. Hence
effective fault-tolerance for complex hardware systems still requires
new and more efficient techniques. Fault-tolerance is achieved by the
use of redundancy, but the application of redundancy has two major
disadvantages. Firstly it occupies some area on chips that can be used
for other components, and secondly increases the complexity of the
system. Therefore an accurate and detailed analysis is needed to
determine the frequency (or percentage) of failure of each individual
component in a system. The result of this analysis will be very helpful
in fault-tolerant designs such that it would inform the designers for an
efficient use of redundancy in the system.
Further investigation is also necessary to establish a general reliability
model which can be used for different types of fault-tolerant
techniques. Currently different reliability models are used for different
groups or individual techniques.
To be able to have a powerful expert system as part of a CAD tool more
extensive knowledge is needed to be gathered to teach the knowledge
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base and more sophisticated techniques should be used for the
implementation of the system.
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Appendix A
Equation 4.4 calculates the logic value of ai (the ith input to the voter
in the NMR reconfigurable scheme on page 67).
ai=gigggie+Xigi+gigiagiit
al=gig7g3+Xigi+gig6g2
a2=g2g1g4+X2g2+g2g7g3
a3=g3g2g5+X3g3+g3gig4
a 4 = g 4 g 3 g 6 +X 4 g 4 + g4g2g5
a5=g5g4g7+X5g5+g5g3g6
a6=g6g5g1-i-X6g6+g6g4g7
a 7 = g 7 g 6 g 2 +X 7 g 7 + g7g5gi
In this appendix values of ai (for i=1 to i=7) will be calculated for two
cases as follows:
Logic values of ai (for i=1 to i=7) have been calculated in the tables
below when three or four modules fail. If the i th module fails g1=1 and
gi =0, and if operates correctly g i =0 and gi =1. The values of a's for any
other combination not shown in the table are similar to one of the
cases shown in the table.
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Case -1
Three modules fail
Faulty modules
1, 2, 3	 1, 2, 4	 1,2,5	 1,2,6	 1,3,5
AU2
	1	 1	 1	 X2
a3	1	 X3	 X3	 X3	 1
a4	X4	 1	 X4	 X4	 X4
a5	X5	 X5	 0	 X5	 1
a6	X6	 X6	 X6	 0	 X6	 .
a7	X7	 X7	 x7	 X7	 X7
Case -2
Four modules fail
Faulty modules
1, 2,3,4	 1,2,3,5
	 1,2, 4,5	 1,3,4,5	 1,3,5,6
a1I	 0	 0	 0	 0	 1
a2	 0	 1	 0	 X2	 X2
a3	1	 1	 X3	 0	 1
a4	1	 X 4	 0	 1	 X4
a5	 X5	 1	 1	 1	 0
a6	X6	 x6	 X6	 X6	 0
a7	X7	 X7	 X7	 X7	 X7
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Appendix B:
	 A Sample Run of the Expert System
/*Enter the knowledge into the knowledge-base by the expert*/
/*Type "E" to enter the knowledge*/
(E)nter, (Q)uery, (S)save, (L)oad, e(X)it
choose one: E
/*Enter the first technique*/
Fault-tolerant technique: DUPLEX1-WITH 0.98>RSYS>0.99
/*Enter its attributes*/
Enter attributes (RETURN to quit)
: 2 BASIC MODULES
: 0.95>RM>0.96 OR -0.051>YT>-0.105
: RSW>0.99
: RD>0.99
: AREA>2*EACH-MODULE-AREA
/*Enter the next technique*/
Fault-tolerant technique: TMR1-WITH 0..982>RSYS>0.986
/*Enter its attributes*/
Enter attributes (RETURN to quit)
: 3 BASIC MODULES
: 0.95>RM>0.96 OR -0.051>YT>-0.105
: VOTER
: RVOTER>0.99
AREA>3*EACH-MODULE-AREA
/*Enter the next technique*/
•
Fault-tolerant technique: 5 CHANNEL HR-HE W:711 0.991>RSYS>0.997
/*Enter its attributes*/
Enter attributes (RETURN to quit)
: 5 BASIC MODULES
: VOTER
: RVOTER>0.999
: RSWITCH-COM>0.999
: 0.80>RM>0.85
: AREA>5*EACH-MODULE-AREA
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/*Type "Q" to query a technique*/
(E)nter, (Q)uery, (S)save, (L)oad, e(X)it
choose one: Q
/*query process
is/does/has it
is/does/has it
is/does/has it
is/does/has it
is/does/has it
is/does/has it
for a TMR*/
2 BASIC MODULES? N
3 BASIC MODULES? Y
0.95>RM>0.96 OR -0.051>YT>-0.105? Y
VOTER? Y
RVOTER>0.99? Y
AREA>3*EACH-MODULE-AREA? Y
The suitable technique is
TMR1-WITH 0.982>RSYS>0.986
(E)nter, (Q) uery, (S)save, (L)oad, e(X)it
choose one: Q
/*query process for a 7 channel HR-HE*/
is
is
is/does/has
is/does/has
is
is/does/has
is/does/has
is/does/has
is/does/has
it 2 BASIC MODULES? N
it 3 BASIC MODULES? N
it 5 BASIC MODULES? IC
it 7 BASIC MODULES'? Y
it 0.80>RM>0.85 OR -0.223>YT>-0.163?
it VOTER? Y
it RVOTER>0.999? Y
it RSWITCH-COM>0.999? Y
it AREA>7*EACH-MODULE-;.REA?
The suitable technique is
7 CHANNEL HR-HE WITH RSYS>0.999
(E)nter, (Q)uery, (S)save, (L)oad, e(X)it
choose one: Q
/*query for
is/does/has
is/does/has
is/does/has
is
is/does/has
is/does/has
is/does/has
is/does/has
a 5 channel HR-HE*/
it 2 BASIC MODULES? N
it 3 BASIC MODULES? s:
it 5 BASIC MODULES?
it VOTER? Y
it RVOTER>0.999? Y
it RSWITCH-CO4>0.999?
it 0.80>RM>0.85?
it AREA>5*EACH-MODUL=-REA?
The sui-.1ble technique is
- CHANNEL HR-HE WITH 0.?=.1:R3YS>0.997
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/*Enter the next technique*/
Fault-tolerant technique: 7 CHANNEL HR-HE WITH RSYS>0.999
/*Enter its attributes*/
Enter attributes (RETURN to quit)
: 7 BASIC MODULES
: 0.80>RM>0.85 OR -0.223>YT>-0.163
: VOTER
: RVOTER>0.999
: RSWITCH-COM>0.999
: AREA>7*EACH-MODULE-7REA
/*Saving the knowledge into the knowledge-base*/
/*Type "S" to save the k-base*/
(E)nter, (Q)uery, (S)save, (L)oad, e(X)it
choose one:choose one: S
saving knowledge base
/*knowledge-base is saved*/
/*To do query about a technique*/
/*knowledge-base should be loaded first*!
/*Type "L" to load the Knowledge-base */
(E)nter, (Q)uery, (S)save, (L)oad, e(X)it
choose one:choose one: L
loading knowledge base
/*knowledge-base is loaded'/
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(E)nter, Muery, (S)save, (L)oad, e(X)it
choose one: Q
/*query for a 7 channel HR-HE*/
/*The system give reasons of selecting a technique*/
/* if type "W" to a question*/
is/does/has it 2 BASIC MODULES? N
is/does/has it 3 BASIC MODULES? N
is/does/has it 5 BASIC MODULES? N
is/does/has it 7 BASIC MODULES? Y
is/does/has it 0.80>RM>0.85 OR -0.223>YT>-0.163? Y
is/does/has it VOTER? Y
is/does/has it RVOTER>0.999? Y
is/does/has it RSWITCH-COM>0.999? W
/*reasons to select the particular technique*/
Trying 7 CHANNEL HR-HE WITH RSYS>0.999
it is/has/does:
7 BASIC MODULES
0.80>RM>0.85 OR 
-0.223>YT>-2.163
VOTER
RVOTER>0.999
and is/has/does not:
2 BASIC MODULES
3 BASIC MODULES
5 BASIC MODULES
/*The end of reasonning*/
is/does/has it RSWITCH-COM>0.999?
is/does/has it AREA>7*EACH-MODULE-AREA? Y
The suitable technique is
7 CHANNEL HR-HE WITH RSYS>Z.999
/*Type "X" to exit the system*/
(E)nter, (Q)uery, (S)save, (L)oad, e(X)it
choose o%e: X
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